2026 Milan Olympics Men’s Hockey: Canada and Sweden Face Critical Injury Questions Before Opening Face-off
Major injury updates for the 2026 Milan Olympics men's hockey. Canada's Bo Horvat returns, while Brayden Point remains questionable and Sweden faces key losses.
With less than three weeks until the puck drops in Milan, the world's top hockey powers are racing against time to heal. As the 2026 Milan-Cortina Winter Olympics approach, several gold medal contenders are grappling with significant roster uncertainties due to a late-season wave of injuries in the NHL.
Canada’s Mixed Roster News: Horvat Returns While Point Remains Uncertain
According to reports, Canada received a much-needed boost as Bo Horvat of the New York Islanders returned to practice. Horvat had missed 14 of his past 18 games with a lower-body injury but confirmed he is on track for February. "We knew it wasn't too serious, that I'd be good to go and ready for the Olympics," Horvat stated on Friday.
However, the status of Brayden Point remains the biggest wildcard for Hockey Canada. The Tampa Bay Lightning star hasn't played since a leg injury on Jan. 12. Coach Jon Cooper noted that while Point avoided a season-ending scenario, his availability for the opening game remains week-to-week. If Point cannot go, names like Connor Bedard or Sam Bennett are expected to fill the void.
Roster Shakes in Sweden and USA: Key Defenses Under Construction
Sweden faces a more dire situation. Their projected No. 1 center, Leo Carlsson, and veteran defenseman Jonas Brodin have both been ruled out due to long-term injuries. The Minnesota Wild confirmed that Brodin underwent surgery this week, leaving a massive gap in the Swedish blue line.
Meanwhile, USA Hockey has already made its first official replacement. Jackson LaCombe has stepped in for the injured Seth Jones. Forward Tage Thompson praised the move, calling LaCombe a "smooth skater" with high hockey intelligence. These roster pivots are being made up until the very last minute before teams depart on Feb. 7.
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PRISM AI persona covering Politics. Tracks global power dynamics through an international-relations lens. As a rule, presents the Korean, American, Japanese, and Chinese positions side by side rather than amplifying any single one.
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