When America's Allies Go Shopping in Beijing

What happens when America's closest friends start looking elsewhere for companionship? The answer is playing out in real time as a parade of Western leaders makes their way to Beijing, even as Washington watches with growing alarm.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney—who just last year called China his country's biggest security threat—visited Beijing last month. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer followed suit. Next week, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will sit down with Xi Jinping for three days of talks about security and trade. The message is unmistakable: America's allies are hedging their bets.

The Divorce Analogy That Hits Too Close to Home

At the World Economic Forum in Davos last month, Carney offered a brutally honest assessment of the current moment. He compared America's allies to "children in a bad divorce, shuttling between two feuding parents, pleasing neither, and risking retaliation if they take sides."

The metaphor stings because it's accurate. Secretary of State Marco Rubio may have declared at the Munich Security Conference that the U.S. "will always be a child of Europe," but Trump's actions tell a different story. Since returning to office, he has slapped 35% tariffs on Canadian goods, threatened to prevent a newly built bridge between Ontario and Michigan from opening, and suggested Canada shouldn't even be manufacturing cars.

"Great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited," Carney observed. It's a world where loyalty is expensive and neutrality is impossible.

The Price of Picking Sides

Lithuania learned this lesson the hard way. During the Biden administration, the tiny Baltic nation eagerly aligned with Washington's anti-China stance, blocking Chinese companies from building its 5G network and allowing Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius. The Atlantic Council praised Lithuania as a "trailblazer" in countering Chinese influence.

The price was swift and severe. China launched economic coercion, forcing Lithuanian diplomats to leave Beijing and temporarily blocking imports of Lithuanian goods. President Gitanas Nausėda called the impact "quite dramatic," but Lithuania hoped its sacrifice would earn greater American security commitments.

Under Trump, those dividends have evaporated. "Small countries do not matter," former Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis summarized Trump's approach. "When great powers begin carving up the world, we find ourselves no longer at the table, but on the menu."

The regret is palpable. Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė recently called the Taiwan office decision a "big mistake," admitting that "Lithuania really jumped in front of a train and lost."

The Beijing Shopping Spree

While Lithuania licks its wounds, other allies are quietly shopping in Beijing. Canada secured agreements for China to lower trade barriers on beef, lobsters, and pet food. Canadian citizens can now visit China visa-free for 30 days. "We are forging a new strategic partnership," Carney declared.

The irony is thick. The same leader who branded China a security threat is now pursuing what he calls a "strategic partnership" with Beijing. Foreign Minister Anita Anand frames it as economic necessity: "Canada is seeking to double non-U.S. trade over the next 10 years."

Germany's approach is more subtle but equally significant. Chancellor Merz met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at Munich, earning praise for maintaining Berlin's "strategic autonomy and self-reliance." France's Emmanuel Macron visited Beijing in December, reportedly rebuffing EU attempts to "Europeanize" his China dealings.

The Magnetic Field Problem

But here's the catch: courting China while maintaining ties with America is like trying to navigate between two repelling magnets. Trump has already lashed out at Canada's Beijing overtures, posting on Truth Social that Carney "wants to make a deal with China—which will eat Canada alive. We'll just get the leftovers! I don't think so."

The power differential makes genuine partnership with China unlikely. As Czech President Petr Pavel—who is banned from China for meeting the Dalai Lama—puts it: "We have to understand that China is not an ally. It is at best our competitor."

Yet Pavel also recognizes the bind his fellow European leaders face. He advocates for a different path: "Europe should become its own zone of influence... not looking eastwards and then westwards and back again, always being afraid for our security, but instead to become stronger and on our own."

The Third Superpower Dream

Carney is pursuing exactly that vision. He's leading talks among Canada, the European Union, and 12 Indo-Pacific nations to form what could become the world's largest economic bloc—a potential third superpower that could resist the gravitational pulls of both Washington and Beijing.

The concept is appealing in theory. In practice, it faces enormous challenges. European unity remains elusive, as evidenced by leaders' individual rushes to Beijing rather than coordinated EU diplomacy. China prefers it that way, dealing with European leaders "one by one" rather than facing a unified bloc.