The Multipolar Delusion: How Wishful Thinking Strengthened US Dominance

From Washington to Beijing, Moscow to New Delhi, there's been a curious consensus: the multipolar world has arrived. America's unrivaled dominance is over, they say. Power is now distributed among multiple centers. Even Marco Rubio, Trump's Secretary of State, declared that America's moment as sole superpower was historically "not normal."

One year later, this consensus looks spectacularly wrong.

The Great Misunderstanding

The problem isn't that everyone's talking about multipolarity—it's that they mean completely different things by it.

For the Trump administration, acknowledging multipolarity isn't about accepting limits on American power. It's about shedding the burdens of global leadership. "Why should we be the world's policeman?" becomes the justification for a more transactional, self-interested foreign policy. America gets to keep the power while dropping the responsibilities.

For China, Russia, and much of the developing world, multipolarity is aspirational—a political project aimed at constraining American dominance and building alternative governance models. The expanded BRICS alliance, China's Belt and Road Initiative, and Russia's aggressive revisionism all serve this vision.

But wanting something doesn't make it real.

The Numbers Don't Lie

To be a genuine "pole" in the international system, you need more than just economic heft or military muscle. You need comprehensive capabilities: global military projection, technological leadership, alliance networks, norm-setting power, public goods provision, and the ability to absorb systemic shocks.

By this standard, America remains in a league of its own:

• Economy: $30 trillion and growing 2-3% annually
• Defense spending: Around $1 trillion, exceeding the next several powers combined
• Global reach: Unparalleled network of alliances, bases, and logistics infrastructure
• Tech dominance: Leading in AI, semiconductors, biotechnology
• Soft power: Universities, cultural industries, innovation networks

China's economy may be two-thirds the size of America's, and its nuclear arsenal may have tripled since 2020, but it still lacks true global reach. The renminbi remains marginal in international transactions. China's military, while formidable in East Asia, can't project power globally. And initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank supplement rather than replace US-anchored institutions.

Russia is even further behind, with little beyond nuclear weapons and energy resources to shape the global system.

The Unipolar Reality Check

Trump's return has exposed the multipolar delusion. Rather than operating in a constrained, balanced system, America has embarked on an aggressive reassertion of power:

• Imposing punitive tariffs
• Intervening in other countries' affairs
• Brokering peace deals and commercial arrangements worldwide

China and Russia resist on select issues but can't mount comprehensive challenges. European allies, facing Trump's pressure, have largely capitulated. The much-vaunted alternative institutions remain peripheral to global governance.

The world isn't becoming multipolar—it's experiencing a new form of unipolarity. America retains its singular position but has shed the self-imposed constraints that once tempered its power.

The Dangerous New Normal

This isn't the benevolent hegemony of the post-Cold War era, where America provided public goods and maintained international institutions. This is raw power projection without the accompanying responsibilities. The Pax Americana has become the Vis Americana—American force without American order.

The implications are profound. When the sole superpower abandons its role as system maintainer, who fills the vacuum? When America pursues narrow self-interest rather than broader stability, what happens to global governance?