Seoul's Defense Spending Surge Signals Alliance Shift

When President Lee Jae-myung pledged to boost South Korea's defense spending to 3.5% of GDP last week, it wasn't just another budget announcement. It was a declaration that Seoul is ready to fundamentally reshape its 70-year alliance with Washington.

Now, a senior Pentagon official has traveled to Seoul to personally endorse this shift. Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, called Lee's decision "clear-eyed and sage," arguing it reflects a mature understanding of how to put the alliance "on sound footing for the long haul."

The timing is no coincidence. Colby's visit comes just days after the Pentagon released its new National Defense Strategy (NDS), which assessed that South Korea can take "primary" responsibility for deterring North Korea, with "critical, but more limited" U.S. support.

From Dependent to Partner

This represents the most significant realignment of the U.S.-ROK alliance since the Korean War. For decades, America served as the dominant security provider on the peninsula. Now, Washington is essentially saying: "You take the lead, we'll back you up."

Colby framed this as President Trump's vision of "shared responsibility rather than permanent dependency." He praised South Korea as a "model" ally that has "fully understood and taken action" on burden-sharing expectations.

The numbers tell the story. South Korea's 3.5% defense spending target far exceeds NATO's 2% guideline and would represent an additional $15-20 billion annually in military investment. Currently, Seoul spends about 2.8% of GDP on defense—already among the highest rates globally.

The China Factor

Colby's choice of South Korea as his first international destination as Under Secretary sends a clear strategic signal. He described the Indo-Pacific as the "primary center of gravity of global growth" and emphasized the need for a favorable "balance of power" to prevent any single state from dominating the region.

While avoiding direct mention of China, Colby outlined a strategy of "deterrence by denial" along the First Island Chain—the strategic perimeter running from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. The goal, he said, is ensuring "aggression along the First Island Chain is infeasible, escalation is unattractive, and war is indeed irrational."

This involves "modernizing force posture across Japan, the Philippines and the Korean Peninsula"—positioning South Korea not just as a regional defender, but as a key pillar in America's broader Indo-Pacific strategy.

Strategic Opportunity or Burden?

For Seoul, this transition offers both opportunities and challenges. On the positive side, taking a leading role could strengthen South Korea's position in cost-sharing negotiations and accelerate its emergence as a major defense exporter. Korean defense contractors have already secured tens of billions in export contracts with Poland, Australia, and other allies.

But the financial reality is sobering. Reaching 3.5% of GDP would require defense spending comparable to South Korea's entire education or welfare budget. More fundamentally, accepting "primary" responsibility means shouldering greater risks in any future conflict.

Some analysts view this shift skeptically, seeing it as American "burden-shifting" rather than genuine partnership evolution. As Washington pivots to great power competition with China, critics argue, it's offloading regional security responsibilities to allies.

Alliance 2.0

Yet Colby's enthusiastic endorsement suggests Washington genuinely views this as alliance strengthening, not abandonment. He emphasized that "such adaptation, such clear-eyed realism" will ensure deterrence remains "credible, sustainable and resilient in this changing world."

The question isn't whether this represents change—it clearly does. The question is whether both allies can successfully navigate this transition while maintaining the deterrent effect that has kept peace on the Korean Peninsula for seven decades.

South Korea's willingness to spend 3.5% of GDP on defense demonstrates serious commitment. But commitment alone doesn't guarantee capability. Can Seoul realistically assume primary responsibility for deterring a nuclear-armed North Korea, even with U.S. backing?