Australia-Indonesia Security Treaty: Strategic Partnership or Paper Promise?

After 27 years of diplomatic distance, Australia and Indonesia have rekindled their security partnership. The Treaty on Common Security, signed February 6th in Jakarta, commits both nations to regular consultations on shared threats and joint security cooperation.

Anthony Albanese told reporters alongside Prabowo Subianto that "no country is more important to Australia or to the prosperity, security and stability of the Indo-Pacific than Indonesia." The Australian Prime Minister called it a "significant extension" of existing defense cooperation, marking his fifth visit to Indonesia since taking office in 2022.

From Partnership to Estrangement to Reconciliation

This treaty carries particular weight given the rocky history between Canberra and Jakarta. The two nations previously had a security agreement signed in 1995 between then-Prime Minister Paul Keating and President Suharto. That partnership collapsed in 1999 when Indonesia withdrew over Australia's involvement in the East Timor crisis.

The bitter fallout lasted nearly three decades. While economic ties continued, security cooperation remained frozen as Indonesia viewed Australia's support for East Timorese independence as a betrayal of regional solidarity.

The new "Jakarta Treaty" builds on the 1996 Lombok Treaty and the 2024 Defense Cooperation Agreement. Both countries commit to regular consultations on "matters affecting their common security" and pursuing "mutually beneficial" security cooperation.

Consultation, Not Commitment

Yet this agreement stops well short of the mutual defense pact Australia signed with Papua New Guinea last year. The treaty language is deliberately cautious: both nations will "consult" if either faces "adverse challenges" and "if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken either individually or jointly."

There's no Article 5-style mutual defense clause. No automatic military obligations. As one Indonesian official told the Sydney Morning Herald, Australia was keen to use the word "treaty" to make the agreement "more eye-catching" than its actual commitments warrant.

This reflects Indonesia's careful balancing act. While sharing some Australian concerns about regional stability, Jakarta maintains its non-aligned foreign policy doctrine, engaging equally with China, Russia, and Western powers.

The China Question: Divergent Approaches

Herein lies the treaty's central tension. Australia increasingly views China's rise through a security lens, strengthening AUKUS ties and pursuing containment strategies. Indonesia sees China as both an economic opportunity and a power to be managed, not confronted.

Susannah Patton from Sydney's Lowy Institute observed that "the idea that Australia and Indonesia agree on the regional security outlook and what they would do in response to some kind of crisis, is just not accurate."

Hangga Fathana from Universitas Islam Indonesia was even more skeptical, noting that while consultative treaties "may reduce misperception," they can also become "a respectable way to delay hard decisions." He emphasized that "visible and measurable" follow-through would be essential.

Practical Cooperation Expands

Alongside the treaty, both leaders announced concrete initiatives: expanded military education exchanges, a new embedded position for a senior Indonesian officer in the Australian Defence Force, and Australian support for joint defense training facilities in Indonesia.

These practical measures may prove more significant than the treaty's symbolic language. They represent Australia's strategy of strengthening Indonesia's defense capabilities to enhance regional stability, while giving Jakarta the military education and infrastructure it seeks.

The Australia-Indonesia treaty may be testing whether strategic ambiguity can provide strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific's increasingly complex security environment.