China and Russia: A Marriage of Convenience?

When China and Russia declared their "no-limits partnership," Western observers saw an anti-Western axis crystallizing. But what if this seemingly solid alliance is built on quicksand?

For Xi Jinping, who emphasizes "macro-historical perspectives" in strategic planning, Russia isn't just a convenient partner against the West. It's a neighbor that China has been watching carefully for 150 years – and the view hasn't always been reassuring.

The Art of Opportunistic Friendship

Picture this: 1856, China is burning. The Second Opium War has British and French forces advancing on Beijing. Then Russia steps in, offering diplomatic mediation like a helpful neighbor.

Except Russia wasn't helping – it was positioning. While publicly mediating, Moscow quietly supported Britain and France, then extracted its own price: massive chunks of Chinese Manchuria through the Treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860).

The ultimate insult? In 1860, Russia established a military outpost on this newly seized territory. They named it Vladivostok – literally "Ruler of the East." The message was unmistakable: while China was weak and divided, Russia was claiming dominance over East Asia.

This wasn't just territorial expansion; it was a masterclass in exploiting vulnerability while maintaining plausible deniability. The enemy of my enemy, it turned out, could still be my enemy.

Revolutionary Promises, Familiar Patterns

The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution seemed to offer a fresh start. Lev Karakhan, Soviet Russia's deputy foreign minister, issued a manifesto in 1919 promising to renounce all unequal treaties and return territories seized by Tsarist Russia.

But as the Bolsheviks consolidated power, promises became negotiable. The second Karakhan Manifesto (1920) quietly dropped commitments about returning the Chinese Eastern Railway. Revolutionary rhetoric, it seemed, couldn't overcome geopolitical logic.

By the time the Bolsheviks fully controlled Moscow in 1922, most of their generous concessions to China had been "reframed" or delayed. The territories remained in Russian hands well into the mid-20th century, long after Western powers had begun dismantling their own concessions in China.

When Brothers Become Enemies

The ultimate test came after Stalin's death in 1953. Mao Zedong increasingly believed that Moscow didn't want a strong, independent China – even a communist one – that could challenge Soviet leadership.

The 1969 armed clashes along the Ussuri River crystallized this reality. Two nuclear-armed socialist nations were shooting at each other across a frozen river. So much for fraternal unity.

For Chinese strategists, this became the defining lesson: neither shared ideology nor formal alliances guarantee lasting cooperation when core interests diverge. This experience shaped China's enduring reluctance to enter binding alliances – visible today in Beijing's "sovereign nationalist" approach to international relations.

Today's Calculated Partnership

So where does this leave today's China-Russia relationship? The personal chemistry between Xi and Putin is real. Their shared opposition to Western dominance is genuine. But scratch beneath the surface, and you'll find 150 years of accumulated wariness.

Consider China's response to Russia's Ukraine invasion. Beijing refuses to join Western sanctions but also avoids providing overt military support. It's a delicate balance that reflects both solidarity and suspicion – supporting Russia enough to maintain the partnership, but not enough to become complicit in its potential failure.

This isn't indecision; it's strategic wisdom informed by historical memory. China remembers what happened when it trusted Russia too completely.

The Limits of "No-Limits"

The current partnership works because both countries need it. Russia needs China's economic lifeline amid Western sanctions. China needs Russia's resources and its role as a strategic counterweight to the US.

But partnerships of convenience have expiration dates. What happens when Russia's war ends? When China's economy slows? When their interests in Central Asia or the Arctic begin to clash more directly?

History suggests that China-Russia cooperation thrives during crises but struggles during stability. The pattern has held for over a century: external pressure brings them together, but success often drives them apart.