The Airport That Anti-Drone Tech Shut Down: A Modern Security Paradox

On February 10, 2026, El Paso International Airport went dark. Not from a power outage or weather emergency, but from the very technology meant to protect it. U.S. Customs and Border Protection had fired a Department of Defense laser weapon at what they believed was a drone crossing from Mexico. The Federal Aviation Administration promptly shut down the airport and surrounding airspace, fearing the weapon itself posed a threat to air traffic.

The target? A party balloon.

This incident captures the absurd yet serious challenge of our drone age: How do you defend against aerial threats without creating new ones?

When Consumer Drones Became Weapons of War

2015 marked a turning point. ISIS militants in Iraq and Syria began dropping grenades from modified commercial drones onto U.S. troops who had no effective countermeasures. What started as a battlefield innovation has spread globally, from Ukraine's 100-drone "Operation Spiderweb" that devastated Russian bomber fleets in 2025 to the three-day shutdown of London's Gatwick Airport in 2018 over a single unidentified drone.

The threat isn't theoretical anymore. Jamey Jacob, director of the Counter-UAS Center of Excellence at Oklahoma State University, points out that critical U.S. infrastructure—airports, power plants, stadiums—remains largely defenseless. "There's little stopping something like this from happening in the U.S.," he warns.

Consider the vulnerability: A malicious actor could theoretically disrupt the 2026 FIFA World Cup matches with a single drone, affecting millions of spectators and global broadcasting. The FAA has banned drone flights over stadiums, but bans don't stop bullets—or drones with ill intent.

The Three-Pronged Defense: Each With Fatal Flaws

Radio frequency jamming represents the "soft kill" approach. These systems detect drone communications and either block signals between pilot and aircraft or send spoofed commands forcing drones into "return to home" mode. It's clean, relatively safe, and widely used in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

But it's not foolproof. Drones operating in "silent mode" won't transmit detectable signals. Jamming GPS affects everyone in the area, not just hostile drones. And increasingly sophisticated drones can navigate using cameras or dead reckoning, making GPS jamming less effective.

Directed energy weapons—like the laser that closed El Paso—use concentrated beams to overheat drone components or disable cameras. They can engage multiple targets simultaneously and offer precise targeting. The downside? They're expensive, struggle with fast-moving targets, and as we've seen, can pose risks to legitimate aircraft.

Kinetic systems physically destroy or capture drones using everything from net-firing interceptors to traditional missiles. They guarantee neutralization but create new problems: Where does the debris fall? In urban areas, a "successfully" downed drone could still cause casualties.

The Swiss Cheese Solution: Imperfect but Necessary

No single technology offers a perfect solution, which is why experts advocate for the "Swiss cheese model"—multiple defensive layers where each system's weaknesses are covered by others. A drone that slips through radio jamming might be caught by a laser system, and one that evades the laser could be physically intercepted.

This layered approach makes sense, but it also multiplies complexity and cost. Each system requires specialized operators, maintenance, and coordination. More concerning, each layer introduces potential interference with legitimate activities—commercial aviation, GPS navigation, cellular communications, and the growing drone delivery industry.

Amazon, UPS, and other companies are investing billions in drone delivery networks. How do you protect against malicious drones without grounding beneficial ones? The technology exists to distinguish friend from foe, but it's not foolproof, and the consequences of mistakes can be severe.

The Regulation Riddle

The El Paso incident highlights a deeper problem: the regulatory framework hasn't caught up with the technology. The FAA had to make a split-second decision to close an entire airport based on the potential threat from a defensive weapon. There's no established protocol for when counter-drone systems themselves become aviation hazards.

This regulatory gap extends globally. While the U.S. military has sophisticated counter-drone capabilities, civilian authorities often lack clear legal authority to deploy them. Local police can't fire lasers at suspicious aircraft, and airport security can't jam radio frequencies without federal approval.

The result is a patchwork of responses that often prove inadequate when seconds matter. By the time authorities determine jurisdiction and authorization, a hostile drone could have completed its mission.