China's Defensive Aggression - Why Beijing Acts Like a Bully While Feeling Like a Victim

Why does China act aggressively across the globe while genuinely believing itself to be a peaceful defender? The answer lies in the Chinese Communist Party's uniquely expansive conception of security—one that transforms what outsiders see as offensive expansion into defensive necessity.

When Defense Requires Global Reach

The CCP's overriding priority is indeed regime survival and protecting core national interests. But Beijing has defined security so broadly that defending it requires reshaping the international environment far beyond China's borders. This isn't simply internal insecurity generating external assertiveness—it's a maximalist conception of defense that makes the CCP defensive in intent but offensive in action.

Consider the pattern: An unprecedented peacetime military buildup, including rapid nuclear expansion, gets framed as "essential deterrence." Sweeping territorial claims in the East and South China Sea, along with steady militarization of disputed areas, become "protecting sovereignty." Pressure on Taiwan transforms into an "internal matter of national reunification."

Even China's years-long campaign to achieve strategic dominance over critical mineral processing—which has given Beijing chokehold power over global supply chains—is cast as economic security. Direct efforts to influence narratives abroad and reshape international norms? Those are portrayed as defensive responses to "anti-China forces."

The Long Arm of 'National Security'

Perhaps nowhere is this mindset clearer than in China's approach to overseas Chinese communities. The CCP doesn't view diaspora Chinese simply as citizens of foreign states, but as integral parts of a broader national community. Their political loyalty becomes a legitimate security interest worth protecting—even across international borders.

Foreign media criticism, whether from diaspora communities or not, often gets interpreted as hostile political action justifying countermeasures ranging from diplomatic protests to economic retaliation. Meanwhile, Chinese national security legislation increasingly asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction, most prominently through Hong Kong's2020 National Security Law.

What foreign countries see as offensive lawfare, the CCP frames as necessary defense against foreign meddling in China's domestic affairs. The logic is internally consistent, even if internationally problematic.

The Myth of Inherent Peacefulness

Two longstanding concepts underpin this defensive mindset. First is China's deep-rooted self-perception as inherently peaceful. As international relations theorist Iain Johnston argued, non-aggression sits at the core of China's version of national exceptionalism. "One of the most deeply ingrained beliefs in China is that the Chinese are a uniquely peaceful people," he observed.

Chinese education, from kindergarten through graduate programs, teaches that China dominated East and Southeast Asia militarily and culturally for millennia without invading or subjugating neighboring powers. Unlike Roman or other Western empires, China supposedly practiced benevolence, leading through moral example rather than conquest.

President Xi Jinping frequently claims that "China will never seek hegemony or pursue a zero-sum world" because "such notions have never been part of China's cultural DNA." Whether historically accurate or not, this conception of a benevolent, pre-19th century Sinocentric order remains a cornerstone of mainstream Chinese discourse.

The Century of Humiliation's Shadow

The second concept is China's profound sense of historical victimhood, which makes seeing itself as an aggressor nearly impossible. Every Chinese person knows about the Century of Humiliation—the period between the 1840s and 1940s when China suffered repeated foreign intervention, national division, and territorial losses.

Modern tensions with Western powers and Japan—China's chief historical tormentors—often get interpreted as continuations of this painful history. The CCP portrays itself as having ended the Century of Humiliation while emphasizing that key lessons must never be forgotten: foreigners are always ready to interfere in and exploit China.

From this perspective, "reunifying" Taiwan represents a major unfinished task and a fully legitimate one. The key impediment is the United States, which—despite not being a major player in China's historical humiliation—has, in the CCP's view, assumed the mantle of leading foreign power attempting to suppress China's rise and topple its regime.

The Policy Challenge

This expansive view of defense creates a particularly thorny challenge for policymakers worldwide. An increasingly aggressive China is difficult enough to manage. China acting like a bully while feeling like a victim makes the situation exponentially worse.

Traditional diplomatic approaches often miss the mark because they don't account for this perceptual gap. Calling out problematic Chinese actions in isolation frequently backfires, reinforcing Beijing's narrative of victimization. Instead, policymakers need strategies that acknowledge China's defensive self-perception while firmly establishing boundaries.

One promising approach involves reframing criticisms as "assurances of reciprocity." Rather than simply condemning Chinese actions, policymakers can explain their responses in terms China might find more palatable: "Just as our country will not pass laws claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction within China, we will not honor Chinese laws that infringe on our sovereignty."

The Reciprocity Framework

When the CCP justifies actions in one domain by citing alleged offenses in another, policymakers should welcome the broader conversation. This creates opportunities to stress that the goal isn't containment or humiliation, but reciprocal respect and responsibilities across all domains of interaction.

This approach won't magically resolve tensions, but it might help prevent the kind of escalatory spirals that occur when each side fundamentally misunderstands the other's motivations. It also puts the burden back on Beijing to explain why reciprocity isn't acceptable.