Why Brazil Stopped Its Trump While America Couldn't

Brazil's messy, corrupt political system just did something America's couldn't: it stopped an authoritarian president dead in his tracks.

When Jair Bolsonaro tried to consolidate power between 2019-2022, Brazil's Congress overrode his vetoes 30 times—more than the previous four presidents combined. Brazil's Supreme Court blocked his emergency powers, investigated his allies, and ultimately sent him to prison for 27 years after a failed coup attempt.

Meanwhile, as Donald Trump launches his second presidency with sweeping executive orders and promises to reshape American institutions, Congress and the Supreme Court have largely acquiesced. The contrast raises an uncomfortable question: How did Brazil—a middle-income country that emerged from military dictatorship just 40 years ago—build more resilient democratic defenses than the world's oldest democracy?

The Corruption That Saved Democracy

The answer lies in a paradox that would make any good-government advocate cringe: Brazil's endemic political corruption may have inadvertently protected its democracy.

Unlike America's two-party system where legislators depend on partisan loyalty for survival, Brazil operates with 20 parties in its lower house. This fragmentation creates what scholars call the Centrão—a "Big Center" coalition of center-right parties that care less about ideology than securing pork-barrel spending for their constituencies.

"We see a powerful presidency but also a potent web of watchdogs standing on guard," wrote political scientists Carlos Pereira and Marcus André Melo in their analysis of Brazil's system. The self-interested logic bound Brazilian leaders to the system, giving them "a direct financial and careerist stake in maintaining democracy."

When Bolsonaro assumed office in 2019, he immediately tested these boundaries. He issued 254 provisional decrees—executive orders with the force of law—during his four-year term, far more than any previous president. But Congress, which must approve these decrees, only ratified 115 of them—a success rate below 50 percent.

The reason was simple: Bolsonaro's power grabs threatened legislators' own authority and access to resources. Unlike Republican lawmakers who feared Trump's base, Brazilian center-right politicians had independent power bases and every incentive to defend their institutional prerogatives.

When Courts Become Democracy's Last Stand

Brazil's Supreme Court proved even more aggressive in constraining Bolsonaro. Justice Alexandre de Moraes emerged as the president's chief antagonist, launching sweeping investigations into "fake news" and anti-democratic activity. When Bolsonaro tried to challenge court authority with massive rallies in 2021, the political backlash forced him to issue a humiliating public apology.

This judicial assertiveness wasn't guaranteed. Before Bolsonaro, Brazil's Supreme Court was deeply divided along ideological lines, with justices who "hated each other" and could be seen "cursing at each other during Supreme Court sessions," according to columnist Celso Rocha de Barros.

But the multiparty system made the difference again. Unlike in America, where presidents can nominate ideologically aligned justices with support from their party's Senate majority, Brazilian presidents must win approval from a Senate representing roughly 12 parties. This makes rubber-stamp appointments nearly impossible.

More importantly, Brazil's post-dictatorship judiciary developed an institutional culture that views itself as democracy's guardian. When Bolsonaro's authoritarian intentions became clear, even ideologically diverse justices united around this core mission.

The contrast with America's Supreme Court, where Trump-appointed justices have consistently ruled in his favor, couldn't be starker.

The Coup That Never Was

The ultimate test came after Bolsonaro lost reelection in October 2022. Facing defeat, he convened military leaders and presented a plan to declare a state of emergency, annul the results, and arrest Justice de Moraes. While the Navy chief signed on, Army and Air Force leaders refused.

When Bolsonaro's supporters stormed government buildings on January 8, 2023—clearly inspired by America's January 6—the military stayed in their barracks. Justice de Moraes moved swiftly to crush the uprising and launch investigations that ultimately sent Bolsonaro to prison.

Why did Brazil's military, historically sympathetic to Bolsonaro, refuse to back his coup? The answer appears to be cold calculation rather than democratic principle. Without consolidated elite support and facing potential international isolation—particularly from the Biden administration—the generals saw little upside and enormous risk in backing the plot.

The American Paradox

The irony is profound: America, with its 250-year democratic tradition and status as the world's wealthiest nation, proved more vulnerable to democratic backsliding than Brazil, a country where middle-aged citizens remember living under military rule.

The difference lies in institutional incentives. American legislators face highly partisan primary voters and depend on their party's national brand for survival. This creates what scholars call "semi-loyal democrats"—politicians who privately harbor doubts about authoritarianism but lack the political courage to resist publicly.

Brazilian legislators, by contrast, win reelection by delivering tangible benefits to local constituencies. Their careers depend on maintaining access to the pork-barrel system, not on ideological purity or party loyalty.

Lessons for American Reform

Brazil's experience suggests specific reforms that could "Brazilianize" American democracy in beneficial ways. A national ban on partisan gerrymandering would create more competitive districts responsive to mainstream voters rather than partisan bases. Reforming or abolishing primary elections—a "corrosive American practice with no real peers elsewhere"—could reduce ideological extremism.

More ambitiously, America could adopt Brazil's provisional decree system, requiring congressional approval for executive orders within a set timeframe. This would force legislators to take responsibility for presidential power grabs rather than hiding behind claims that "it's out of our hands."

These reforms wouldn't eliminate corruption or partisan conflict. But they might create the kind of self-interested institutional resistance that helped Brazil survive its democratic crisis while America struggles with its own.