America's War in Iran: When Unclear Goals Meet Unpredictable Outcomes

An Iranian flag planted in the rubble of a Tehran police station tells the story of a war that began for reasons nobody can quite explain. One month into America's conflict with Iran, the justification keeps shifting—preemptive self-defense, nuclear prevention, regime change—depending on who's speaking and who's listening.

This confusion over objectives makes predicting the war's end nearly impossible. But eight leading experts on Iran and military policy offer some clarity on where this might be heading.

Why Bombing Won't Topple the Regime

The Trump administration's best-case scenario is clear: American bombs inspire Iranian people to rise up and overthrow their government. It's also, according to experts, pure fantasy.

"It's a fantasy to think that aerial bombardment is going to open such a gap that there will be a new regime," says Hussein Banai, who studies Iranian politics at the University of Indiana-Bloomington. No air campaign in history has ever achieved this alone.

The reality on the ground supports this skepticism. Despite killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the regime remains stable. Unlike Putin in Russia, Khamenei wasn't the indispensable man. Revolutionary Guard generals and civilian leaders like Ali Larijani have seamlessly continued governing.

When Iranians protested en masse this January, the regime's response was brutal and effective: 30,000 killed in a horrifyingly short span. For bombing to inspire another uprising, people would need reason to expect a different outcome. That reason doesn't exist.

"We see no indications that security forces hesitated to crack down in the past several months," notes Marie Harf, executive director of the University of Pennsylvania's Perry World House.

The More Likely Path: Settlement or Withdrawal

Most experts expect the war to end short of regime change through one of two scenarios.

The first is the "Venezuela model"—a negotiated settlement where Trump gets meaningful concessions while leaving the regime intact. This could involve oil deals favoring the US, nuclear program restrictions, or ballistic missile limitations.

"I think these guys will immediately not make a deal, because they need to show they are not pushovers. But then they ultimately will," predicts Arash Azizi, an Iran expert at Yale University.

The second scenario involves Trump simply declaring victory and going home. Killing Khamenei and damaging nuclear sites might provide enough political cover for withdrawal, especially if markets panic or American casualties mount.

"It almost seems inevitable to me that President Trump is going to dial back whatever his more maximalist vision is and settle for something less," says Michael Koplow of the Israel Policy Forum.

Either outcome would infuriate Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who reportedly helped convince Trump to launch the war. But Israel's influence over the conflict's duration remains limited.

The Tail Risk: Iraq 2.0

The most dangerous scenario—and thankfully the least likely—involves escalation into a full ground war aimed at regime change.

Most observers believe Americans lack appetite for another major Middle East ground war. Trump's mentions of potential ground troops are widely seen as bluffing. But what if they're not?

Michael Hanna of the International Crisis Group describes a scenario where Iran pulls off a devastating attack—killing dozens of American soldiers or sinking a US warship. Such an event could trigger an escalatory cycle where each side's response demands a stronger counter-response.

"Once such a cycle begins," Hanna warns, "all bets are off." Events would take on their own logic, potentially leading to the extended ground occupation nobody currently wants or can imagine.

This represents what statisticians call a "tail risk"—an extreme outcome at the far end of probability distribution. It's unlikely, but war's inherent unpredictability means it's not impossible.

The Unpredictable Nature of War

What makes this conflict particularly dangerous is its regional spread and unclear objectives. The US has already lost six soldiers, Gulf states are taking heavy damage, and the global economy faces mounting pressure.

"No world leader has ever launched a military operation expecting a quagmire," observes Caitlin Talmadge, who studies war at MIT. "What you've essentially heard our leaders saying is denying that these risks exist, and that they're effectively in control of the tempo and outcomes—and that's antithetical to everything we know about how war works."

The historical parallel is sobering. George W. Bush ran as an intervention skeptic in 2000, but unforeseen events transformed his presidency. Trump's skepticism about ground wars doesn't guarantee he'll avoid one.