America's Fear-Driven Foreign Policy: When Strength Masks Insecurity

54% of Americans believe their country is becoming less powerful in the world. Yet under Donald Trump's second term, the United States has launched military raids in Venezuela, struck Iranian nuclear facilities, and threatened Denmark over Greenland. This isn't the behavior of a declining power—or is it?

The paradox lies at the heart of contemporary American foreign policy: a nation wielding unprecedented military force while consumed by fears of its own diminishing status. Stephen Miller's blunt justification for the Caracas raid—"we live in a world that is governed by strength, force, and power"—sounds like confidence. But the pattern of targets reveals something else entirely.

The Curious Case of American Target Selection

When great powers feel secure, they focus on genuine threats. When they feel insecure, they pick fights they can win.

Trump's second-term military adventures follow a telling pattern. Rather than confronting peer competitors like China or Russia, the administration has targeted weak adversaries and even allies. The Venezuelan operation captured Nicolás Maduro but offered no strategic advantage in great power competition—China won't suffer significantly from losing access to Caracas. The Iranian strikes, while perhaps predictable given Tehran's nuclear progress, came with explicit assurance that China could continue purchasing Iranian oil.

Most revealing is the Greenland gambit. Trump's threats against Denmark—a NATO ally—promised no new military or economic benefits. Arctic security experts note that the real threat lies in the Bering Strait, where Russian and Chinese naval forces conduct joint exercises near Alaska. The seas around Greenland remain comparatively quiet. Moscow, tellingly, applauded Washington's move against its NATO partner.

The administration's own National Defense Strategy undermines claims that these interventions serve broader strategic competition. It characterizes the U.S.-China rivalry as limited to the Indo-Pacific, not a global Cold War, and downplays Russia as a threat even further.

The Psychology of Decline

Trump's anxieties about American prestige aren't new political rhetoric—they're a consistent worldview spanning decades.

In 1987, he sponsored newspaper advertisements claiming the world was "taking advantage" of the United States. "The world is laughing at America's politicians," he wrote. In 2023, he complained about "begging" Venezuela for oil despite record U.S. domestic production. During the 2024 campaign, he characterized America as "a failing nation" and "like a third-world nation."

This pattern reflects what political scientist Jeffrey Taliaferro identifies as classic great power behavior when facing perceived decline: risky interventions in peripheral regions motivated by status anxiety rather than strategic gain. Britain's predatory efforts in Egypt and Iran during the 1950s, driven by fears of losing imperial influence, offer a historical parallel. The United States'1950 intervention in Korea was similarly motivated by concerns about shifting global power after the first Soviet nuclear test and communist victory in China.

Trump has been unusually explicit about these psychological motivations, describing ownership of Greenland as "psychologically important for success." This candor reveals the emotional underpinnings of what appears to be strategic policy.

The Reality Check: Is America Actually Declining?

The data presents a complex picture that defies simple narratives of American decline or dominance.

In relative terms, the gap between American power and other states has indeed shrunk. China represents the closest thing to a peer competitor since the Cold War's end. India, Europe, and much of East Asia have grown stronger. But this reflects global development success rather than American failure.

The YouGov survey revealing 54% of Americans believe their country is becoming less powerful also shows 75% consider global influence important. Notably, generational differences emerge: 80% of respondents over 45 value American global influence, compared to 70% of Millennials and Gen-Z.

Yet many concerning trends remain reversible. Military modernization, alliance strengthening, and fiscal responsibility could maintain American preeminence. The question isn't whether the United States can remain the world's most powerful state—it's whether fear-driven policies will become a self-fulfilling prophecy of decline.

The Allies' Dilemma

Washington's behavior creates profound challenges for partners worldwide.

NATO allies watch nervously as the United States threatens Denmark over Greenland while Russia applauds from the sidelines. The message sent isn't strength but unpredictability—hardly reassuring for countries depending on American security guarantees.

In the Indo-Pacific, partners like Japan, South Korea, and Australia must balance their need for American protection against China with concerns about being dragged into unnecessary conflicts driven by Washington's status anxieties rather than strategic necessity.

For adversaries, the pattern offers opportunities. China and Russia can portray themselves as stable, predictable powers compared to an increasingly erratic America. They benefit when the United States expends resources on peripheral conflicts while neglecting core competitive challenges.