Mexico's Most Wanted Cartel Boss is Dead. Why Did Violence Get Worse?

Mexico's most powerful cartel boss is dead. So why are more people dying?

On February 22, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes—better known as "El Mencho"—died in custody after being critically wounded during a firefight with Mexican authorities. The head of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) was one of the world's most wanted drug lords. His death should have been a victory. Instead, it unleashed chaos across multiple Mexican cities, leaving 73 people dead in the violent aftermath.

The Rise of El Mencho

Oseguera Cervantes embodied the typical trajectory of Mexico's cartel leaders: starting from the bottom and clawing his way to the top. After being deported from the U.S. in 1997, he connected with the Milenio Cartel and eventually formed the CJNG around 2010.

What made his organization different was its brazenness. Since 2015, the CJNG became notorious for direct attacks on security forces—including shooting down a military helicopter. The cartel expanded beyond drug trafficking into oil theft, human smuggling, and extortion, building networks across all Mexican states and internationally.

This wasn't just another criminal organization. It was a parallel power structure that had embedded itself deep into Mexico's social and economic fabric.

Why Killing the Boss Makes Things Worse

Experts who study Mexico's cartels saw this coming. Angélica Durán-Martínez, who has researched criminal organizations for two decades, notes that "Mexican governments have opted for high-profile hits that often lead only to more violence without addressing the broader security problems."

The violence follows a predictable pattern. First comes immediate retaliation—the blockades, attacks on civilians, and revenge strikes we're seeing now. CJNG members are simultaneously seeking vengeance and trying to demonstrate that their organization remains powerful despite their leader's death.

Then comes the longer-term fragmentation. Internal power struggles will likely tear the organization apart as lieutenants fight for control. Meanwhile, rival cartels will try to seize territory and smuggling routes. We've seen this movie before—in 2019 and 2023 when Ovidio Guzmán López was captured in Sinaloa.

The Deeper Problem

Here's the paradox: some of Mexico's security indicators were actually improving. Homicide rates declined in 2025, which should be good news. But disappearances remain disturbingly high, and criminal organizations continue to exercise what academics call "criminal governance"—regulating daily life in communities, sometimes through coercion, sometimes with a degree of local legitimacy.

In states like Sinaloa, despite repeated operations against cartel leaders, illicit economies remain extensive and profitable. The day-to-day reality for residents is still one of fear. Criminal networks remain embedded in the country's economy and politics in complex ways that can't be solved by removing individual leaders.

The Theater of Security

President Claudia Sheinbaum's government wanted a big, visible win at a time when the U.S. is pushing for more militarized anti-cartel policies. But this approach prioritizes optics over outcomes.

It's easier to announce "we captured a drug lord" than to address systemic corruption or impunity. Most high-profile captures aren't accompanied by broader investigations into disappearances, murders, or corruption. They rarely halt drug flows or dismantle criminal networks.

These operations serve a strategic purpose—showing that something is being done. But their long-term effectiveness is questionable at best. The main crimes that affect ordinary Mexicans—homicides, disappearances, extortion—continue largely unabated.

Beyond the Headlines

Of course, people like Oseguera Cervantes who engage in violence need to face justice. But if these operations aren't part of a broader strategy to dismantle criminal networks and deliver justice for victims, they become little more than expensive theater.

The real challenge isn't capturing cartel bosses—it's addressing the conditions that allow these organizations to thrive: corruption, impunity, poverty, and weak institutions. It's about building legitimate governance structures that can compete with criminal ones.