Trump's Iran Gamble: Why This War Feels Like a Casino Bet

The United States has gone to war against a nation of 92 million people. Donald Trump calls it preemptive, but let's be clear: this is not a war of imminent necessity. This is a war of choice—a discretionary conflict aimed at regime change.

America has exactly one openly declared ally in this operation: Israel. Even the Gulf Arab states, who fear the Iranian regime, have stayed on the sidelines. In his recorded address, Trump didn't bother much with claims of "imminent" threats. Instead, he rattled off half a century of grievances—from killing American troops in Iraq to terrorism. These charges are grounded in truth, but none justify immediate attack.

The president ended with a call for Iranians to rise up and overthrow their government. It's a familiar playbook, but history suggests the house always wins.

The Narrow Path to "Success"

Let's establish three uncomfortable truths. First, Iran's regime deserves to fall. A government that recently murdered thousands of its own freedom-seeking citizens deserves no sympathy. Second, "success"—meaning the ayatollahs' fall and rise of a pro-Western democracy—isn't impossible. But the path is exceedingly narrow and mined with hazards.

Destroying the regime's capabilities is relatively easy. As Americans learned in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, nothing permanent is achieved by bouncing rubble and piling up bodies. Destroying the regime itself? That's far trickier. Dictatorships have high pain tolerance, especially when hapless citizens, not leaders, bear the brunt.

Third, Trump has offered no strategy, no conditions signaling when U.S. goals are achieved. Beyond preventing nuclear weapons, he seems to assume enough ordinance on enough targets will weaken the ayatollahs' grip. Once the theocrats are on the ropes, the thinking goes, Iranians will finish the job for us.

When America Called for Uprising Before

We've tried this script before. In 1991, after stripping Saddam Hussein of military power, George H.W. Bush called on Iraqis to rise up. Disaster followed. Saddam attempted genocide against Kurds in the north and rebelling Marsh Arabs in the south—campaigns that would have been even more murderous without U.S. and British airpower.

In 2003, we succeeded in toppling the Iraqi regime, then bumbled through ensuing chaos. Charmed by stories of Jeffersonian democrats lining up to run the country, we disbanded the Iraqi military and exiled all Ba'ath Party members. These were disastrous choices, undertaken with far more preparation than Trump has apparently given to war against a much larger nation.

Years later, the U.S. and allies conducted similar operations in Libya. With UN Security Council approval and vows of no boots on the ground, American and NATO aircraft stripped Muammar Qaddafi of military assets, leaving him vulnerable to armed rebels. They nearly tore Qaddafi to pieces. Then we washed our hands of the whole business.

This Time, the Odds Are Worse

Conditions now are more challenging. The target is two and a half times the size of Iraq. America has exactly one openly declared ally, no serious armed rebel force exists in Iran, and no coalition is assembling to march into Tehran.

Trump boldly told the regime to surrender—but to whom? He hasn't ruled out American troops on the ground. Does he envision a conquering American general accepting Revolutionary Guard pistols in some ceremony?

Here's the one way this goes right: The air campaign is so precise and thorough it strips the regime of major military formations and security police. Top leaders die in partial decapitation, other forces defect en masse. Rebel groups form quickly to seize weapons and establish alternative councils nationwide. They cooperate rather than fight. Outside powers stay away and let Iranians sort their destiny.

The More Likely Scenarios

Unfortunately, ways this goes wrong are more numerous and likely. Perhaps Americans take unexpected casualties, and Trump—counting on easy victory—pulls back. The regime rallies, kills more citizens, and survives. Or the current regime falls, replaced by an even more brutal military junta.

What if Iranian retaliation proves more effective than Americans or Israelis expect? The region becomes embroiled in cycles of murder and reprisals, leaving Americans, Israelis, and others dead while the regime remains intact.

Another possibility: bombing goes well, but America demurs from doing more, abandoning the rebellion. People who believed American cavalry was coming find themselves, like Afghans, left to be cut to pieces by a regime we've grown tired of fighting.

When the 2003 Iraq war ended, U.S. Ambassador Barbara Bodine said American diplomats joked ruefully about reconstruction: "There were 500 ways to do it wrong and two or three ways to do it right. What we didn't understand is that we were going to go through all 500."