America's China Consensus Is Dead—And Republicans Are Leading the Charge

Two-thirds of Republicans now view China as a threat to America. Only 44% of Democrats and Independents agree. This 16-point gap—the largest in half a century of polling—signals the complete breakdown of bipartisan consensus on one of America's most consequential foreign policy relationships.

The Great Reversal

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs released startling findings Wednesday that reveal how dramatically American attitudes toward China have shifted—but not in the direction most expected. Overall, 53% of Americans now favor friendly cooperation with China, up from 40% in 2024. It's the first time since 2019 that a majority has preferred engagement over confrontation.

But this headline number masks a profound political realignment. While Republicans have hardened their stance against Beijing, Democrats have moved in the opposite direction, embracing dialogue and cooperation. The result transforms China from a rare point of bipartisan agreement into another battlefield in America's polarized political landscape.

"This shift is primarily driven by Democrats' change in opinion," explained Dina Smeltz, the Council's managing director of public opinion and foreign policy. As Trump's second administration takes shape with promises of aggressive China policies, Democrats appear to be staking out opposing territory.

What This Means for Business and Diplomacy

For multinational corporations, this partisan divide creates a new category of political risk. Companies operating in China—from Apple to Tesla—now face the prospect of wildly different regulatory environments depending on which party controls Washington. What's permissible under a Democratic administration could become prohibited under Republicans, and vice versa.

The implications extend far beyond trade policy. Technology transfer restrictions, investment screening, and even academic exchanges could swing dramatically with each election cycle. This unpredictability may force companies to develop separate strategies for different political scenarios—a costly hedge against America's fractured consensus.

For allies like South Korea and Japan, caught between their security partnership with America and their economic dependence on China, this partisan split complicates long-term strategic planning. How do you align with an ally whose China policy changes fundamentally every four to eight years?

The End of Strategic Patience?

This polarization also raises questions about America's ability to sustain long-term competition with China. Effective great power rivalry typically requires consistency across multiple administrations—something that becomes nearly impossible when each party views the challenge through completely different lenses.

Republicans increasingly frame the relationship in zero-sum terms, emphasizing military competition and economic decoupling. Democrats, meanwhile, appear more willing to compartmentalize cooperation in areas like climate change while competing in others. These aren't just tactical differences—they represent fundamentally different theories of how international relations work.