Why China Won't Join the Nuclear Club's New Rules

With the world's last binding nuclear arms treaty expiring on February 5, the US is pushing for something unprecedented: a three-way nuclear deal that includes China. Beijing's response? A firm no.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio made the case Wednesday from Saint Kitts and Nevis: "For there to be a true arms control agreement in the 21st century, it has to involve China." But he also acknowledged reality: "We can't force them to do it."

The standoff reveals a fundamental shift in global nuclear dynamics—and why traditional arms control frameworks may no longer work.

America's New Math: Why Three Matters More Than Two

The Trump administration's rejection of Russia's offer to extend the New START treaty for another year isn't just diplomatic posturing. It reflects a strategic calculation based on China's rapid nuclear modernization.

Pentagon estimates suggest China currently holds around 400 warheads but plans to expand to over 1,000 by 2030. While still dwarfed by American (5,428) and Russian (5,977) arsenals, the trajectory matters more than current numbers.

"We think it would be good for the world if we could reach such an agreement," Rubio said, framing the push as global responsibility rather than containment. Yet the timing—ahead of Trump's April visit to China—suggests this is as much about managing strategic competition as preventing proliferation.

The US position essentially argues that yesterday's bilateral framework can't address tomorrow's multipolar nuclear reality.

China's Counter-Logic: Why Join an Unequal Game?

Beijing's refusal isn't mere stubbornness—it's strategic logic. From China's perspective, the proposal is fundamentally unfair.

Chinese officials have consistently argued that the US and Russia should first make "drastic reductions" before bringing other nuclear powers into negotiations. Why should a country with 400 warheads accept the same constraints as nations holding 10 times more?

China also maintains its "minimum deterrence" doctrine—keeping just enough nuclear weapons to ensure retaliation capability. Accepting limits comparable to the superpowers would, in Beijing's view, undermine this defensive posture and legitimize American nuclear superiority.

There's also a deeper sovereignty issue. China sees the trilateral proposal as an attempt to constrain its rise while preserving the US-Russia nuclear duopoly that has dominated since the Cold War.

Russia's Dilemma: Partner or Mediator?

Moscow finds itself in an awkward position. Having offered a simple one-year extension of New START—which Trump rejected—Russia now faces competing pressures.

On one hand, its strategic partnership with China suggests supporting Beijing's position. On the other, maintaining nuclear dialogue with Washington serves Russian interests in preserving its status as a nuclear superpower.

Russia hasn't yet declared a clear stance on trilateral negotiations, perhaps calculating that staying neutral maximizes its leverage with both sides.

The Negotiation Reality Check

Despite Rubio's assertion of "strategic stability" in US-China relations, the nuclear issue reveals deeper structural tensions that diplomatic summits can't easily resolve.

The April Trump-Xi meeting will likely focus on trade, technology competition, and Taiwan rather than nuclear arms control. Both leaders face domestic pressures that make nuclear concessions politically costly.

Moreover, the three countries operate from fundamentally different strategic cultures. American arms control thinking emphasizes numerical parity and verification. Chinese doctrine prioritizes assured retaliation over numerical equality. Russian strategy blends superpower nostalgia with regional security concerns.