Hamas Tells Iran: Stop Hitting Our Other Friends

When the client tells the patron to stand down, something has shifted.

On March 14, 2026, Hamas issued a public appeal to Iran — its most important backer — urging Tehran to stop attacking Gulf states. The statement called on "brothers in Iran to avoid targeting neighbouring countries" and asked all regional nations to cooperate "to preserve the bonds of brotherhood." In the same breath, Hamas affirmed Iran's right to defend itself against ongoing US and Israeli strikes. Support the cause. Just stop hitting everyone around it.

Eighteen Dead in Two Weeks

To understand why Hamas felt compelled to speak, you need to understand what the past two weeks have looked like on the ground.

The war began on February 28, when joint US-Israeli strikes killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran's response was swift and sustained: drone and missile strikes across the Gulf region, framed by Tehran as targeting "American installations" on Gulf soil rather than the host nations themselves. But the distinction hasn't held in practice.

Six people have been killed in the UAE, six in Kuwait, and two each in Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain — 18 deaths in total, mostly security personnel and foreign workers. The port of Fujairah in the UAE — home to a major oil export terminal — was struck by a drone on Saturday. Civilian infrastructure has taken repeated hits. The Gulf is rattled.

Iran has not publicly responded to Hamas's statement.

Why Hamas Stepped In

Hamas is a core member of Iran's so-called "axis of resistance" — a loose coalition built around opposing US and Israeli influence in the region. Iran provides Hamas with funding, weapons, and political cover. When Khamenei was killed, Hamas called it a "heinous crime."

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So why is Hamas now asking Iran to pull back?

The answer likely involves competing dependencies. Turkey and Qatar — both of which have recently come under Iranian fire — are also significant financial and political supporters of Hamas. When Iran's strikes start threatening the other patrons, Hamas finds itself caught between its backers.

There's also the matter of Gaza itself. A US-brokered ceasefire took effect last October, but it has been fragile at best. Israel and Hamas have accused each other of near-daily violations. The Hamas-run health ministry reports 649 people killed in Gaza since the ceasefire began. Negotiations over later phases of the deal are ongoing. A widening regional war is not in Hamas's interest at this moment — it complicates diplomacy and risks drawing more international condemnation toward the entire axis.

The Gulf States' Impossible Position

For Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and their neighbors, this war has exposed a long-standing tension. These states host significant US military infrastructure — making them, by Iran's logic, legitimate targets. But they have also spent years carefully managing relations with Tehran, keeping economic and diplomatic channels open even as geopolitical pressures mounted.

Now those calculations are being stress-tested in real time. Gulf governments are not formally at war with Iran. They didn't choose this conflict. Yet their citizens are dying and their infrastructure is burning.

The question of how the Gulf states emerge from this — and what relationship they want with Iran afterward — may shape the region's political architecture for years.

What the Energy Markets Are Watching

The strike on Fujairah is not an abstraction for global markets. The UAE port is one of the world's most important oil export hubs. Sustained attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure — even if not catastrophically damaging yet — introduce a risk premium that ripples through oil prices, shipping costs, and supply chain planning worldwide.

For policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and Beijing, the calculation is increasingly urgent: how long can this escalation continue before the economic consequences become impossible to contain?