Congress vs. Trump: The Quiet Battle Over Taiwan

564 bills. That's how many pieces of China-related legislation Congress introduced by August 2025, with 247 containing substantive provisions. While Trump shook hands with Xi Jinping in Busan, talking about "decent peace" between superpowers, lawmakers on Capitol Hill were quietly waging their own campaign—one focused squarely on countering China and protecting Taiwan.

Trump 2.0: Maximum Power, Different Priorities

Trump's second presidency looked nothing like his first. Gone were the senior officials who quietly redirected his policies behind closed doors. Instead, he wielded unprecedented control: Republican majorities in Congress, a Supreme Court with six GOP-appointed justices (three his own), and an administration filled with loyalists.

This consolidation showed most clearly in China policy. Two brief but tense standoffs in April and October—complete with threats of massive tariffs and export controls—quickly gave way to compromise. The October 28 Trump-Xi summit in South Korea ended "amicably," setting the stage for planned visits: Trump to China in April 2026, Xi to the US later that year.

For Taiwan, the signals were mixed at best. Ahead of the Xi meeting, the Trump administration reportedly halted a planned US visit by Taiwan's defense minister and blocked a stopover by Taiwan President Lai Ching-te. Arms sales were delayed. US Navy transits through the Taiwan Strait went unpublicized. Trump claimed Taiwan "was not discussed" at the summit.

Congress: The Unlikely Guardian

But while Trump pursued his "visionary and realistic approach to diplomacy with Beijing," Congress told a different story. Led by the House Select Committee on the CCP, Republicans and Democrats maintained their post-2018 consensus on hardening US policy toward China—regardless of what the White House wanted.

The numbers speak volumes. By August 2025, those 564 China-related bills covered everything from Taiwan support to technology decoupling to rare earth supply chains. Most striking was the bipartisan nature of this activism, even as Democrats criticized Trump's tariffs and other policies.

When Democrats did break with the administration, it wasn't because they wanted a softer China policy—it was because they thought Trump was being too soft. They slammed his decision to end Voice of America support and international climate programs, arguing these moves weakened American resolve against Beijing.

The Nvidia Test Case

The clearest example came in December when Trump approved sales of Nvidia's advanced AI chips to China. Democratic criticism was swift and fierce, but so was Republican pushback. Senate Intelligence Committee Chair Tom Cotton introduced a bipartisan bill to block such sales just days before Trump's decision.

In January, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 42-2 on legislation giving Congress greater control over AI chip exports to China—a direct rebuke to White House AI czar David Sacks and the administration's more accommodating stance.

Taiwan's Insurance Policy

For Taiwan, these congressional actions served as crucial insurance against potential White House compromises with Beijing. While Trump's November 30 National Security Strategy didn't identify China as a danger, and his January 23 National Defense Strategy only obliquely mentioned Taiwan as part of "first island chain" defense, Congress delivered concrete support.

The December 2 Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act, the December 17 announcement of $11 billion in arms sales, and the January 15 trade deal promising $250 billion in Taiwan investment—all bore Congress's fingerprints and enjoyed bipartisan support.

The Limits of Presidential Power

Trump's tight control over Republicans showed cracks elsewhere too. His complaints failed to eliminate the Senate filibuster or change Judiciary Committee practices that give home-state senators veto power over federal appointments. By 2026, resistance was growing more visible.

Seventeen House Republicans joined Democrats to extend pandemic-era healthcare subsidies. Spending bills rejected Trump's proposed cuts and were "carefully worded to give the administration less opportunity to make unilateral funding decisions." Military action in Venezuela and threats against Greenland drew bipartisan pushback.

The Deeper Game

What emerges is a fascinating case study in American institutional resilience. Trump may control the executive branch and enjoy Republican congressional majorities, but the legislative branch's constitutional prerogatives—and its members' electoral incentives—create natural limits on presidential power.

On China and Taiwan, this dynamic works in Taiwan's favor. Congressional hawks from both parties see political advantage in being tough on Beijing, while Taiwan's effective lobbying operation has cultivated deep bipartisan relationships built over decades.

The result is a peculiar form of policy insurance: even as Trump pursues his "decent peace" with Xi, Congress maintains pressure that makes dramatic compromises at Taiwan's expense politically costly and practically difficult.

Is messy democracy Taiwan's best defense, or America's greatest weakness in great power competition?