Trump's Power Play: Is Asia Next on the Target List?

On February 28, the USS Delbert D. Black fired Tomahawk missiles in support of Operation Epic Fury against Venezuela. The same month saw Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei killed and an Iranian frigate sunk by a U.S. torpedo off Sri Lanka's coast. Donald Trump's "might makes right" foreign policy is no longer theoretical—it's operational.

The Unchanging American DNA

Trump is often portrayed as a foreign policy revolutionary. His disdain for allies, disregard for global norms, and rejection of values-driven diplomacy certainly distinguish him from predecessors. But scratch beneath the surface, and a different picture emerges.

From George W. Bush's neoconservatives to the liberal internationalists of Clinton, Obama, and Biden, one thread connects every post-Cold War presidency: maintaining U.S. primacy and bending rules when convenient. Whether through "coalitions of the willing" in Iraq or refusing to ratify UNCLOS, America's global order has always been what Canadian PM Mark Carney called a "pleasant fiction" at Davos.

The strongest states "exempt themselves when convenient," and international law gets "applied with varying rigor depending on the identity of the accused or the victim." Trump simply dropped the pretense. No more lip service to international law, fewer Congressional constraints, no UN mandate requirements.

Regime Change: America's Recurring Obsession

Every new administration criticizes its predecessor for "getting bogged down" in humanitarian interventions and endless wars. Yet each inevitably succumbs to the same temptation.

Since 1990, we've seen U.S. military operations justified by upholding the "rules-based order" (Kuwait), humanitarian concerns (Balkans, Somalia), national security (Afghanistan post-9/11), or pure power politics (Iraq 2003's false WMD claims). Now Trump pursues Nicolás Maduro's capture and Khamenei's elimination—despite neither Venezuela nor Iran posing imminent threats to America.

Contrast this with emerging powers like China and India. While they flex muscles in their neighborhoods, their instinct is aloofness, not intervention. This earns criticism for being "timid" or "free riders," but it reveals a fundamentally different approach to global power.

Asia's False Sense of Security

The Iranian frigate's sinking near Sri Lanka is deeply symbolic. The vessel had just participated in India's MILAN naval exercise before being torpedoed in Narendra Modi's backyard. India's silence in the face of U.S. aggression in its own neighborhood exposes the hollowness of its "voice of the Global South" ambitions.

China faces similar credibility issues. Its four global initiatives covering development, security, civilization, and governance ring hollow when it cannot defend key partners like Venezuela and Iran. Both countries' aspirations to become "net security providers" in the Global South have taken serious hits.

Asian nations might feel relieved that America has its hands full with Middle Eastern instability, the Ukraine war, and the "Donroe Doctrine" claiming exclusive Western Hemisphere influence. These commitments seemingly limit Washington's bandwidth for Asian interventions—explaining successive administrations' failed "pivots" to Asia.

But this comfort is misplaced. During the Cold War, America's longest military intervention was the Vietnam War—in Asia. After overthrowing regimes in Latin America and the Middle East, why would Washington draw the line at Asia?

Technology Lowers the Intervention Bar

Recent developments should alarm Asia. Washington pounces on adversaries at the first sign of weakness, whether for power or ideological reasons. Technological advances in precision strikes and drone warfare make intervention less risky by keeping Americans out of harm's way.

Kim Jong Un may feel protected by nuclear weapons, but Trump's emboldened administration might think differently after its "successes" in Venezuela and Iran. Even Beijing isn't entirely safe. While the probability of decapitating Chinese leadership remains near zero, it has arguably increased given Trump's risk appetite and his administration's China hawks.

From Washington's perspective, moving against China sooner rather than later makes strategic sense—the military balance continues shifting in China's favor over time.

Even democratic regimes and U.S. allies aren't immune, as Trump's Greenland threats demonstrate.

The New Meaning of De-risking

Post-COVID discussions focused on "de-risking" from China due to overwhelming supply-chain dependencies. Now de-risking increasingly means reducing exposure to America's fickle, "might is right" foreign policy.

Former Japanese PM Kishida Fumio famously warned that "today's Ukraine may be tomorrow's East Asia" after Russia's 2022 invasion. That phrase now needs updating: "Today's Middle East could be tomorrow's Asia," given Trump's hubris and America's never-ending mission to proselytize and preserve primacy.