There Is Only One Sphere of Influence

When Donald Trump revived talk of acquiring Greenland and America captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, commentators reached for familiar phrases: the rebirth of the Monroe Doctrine, the return of great-power spheres of influence. But these episodes revealed something more extraordinary. Today's world has only one true sphere of influence.

The Lonely Superpower

Michael Beckley from Tufts University makes a striking observation: America alone dominates a vast home region, using it as a hemispheric base to project power globally with little constraint. Meanwhile, China and Russia can't even consolidate control over their own neighborhoods.

This configuration has no modern precedent. During the Cold War, America's sphere faced off against a massive Soviet one. In earlier multipolar eras, European powers planted colonies deep in the Western Hemisphere, challenging US influence close to home. But that world is gone.

Today, America spends up to 12 times more on defense than all other Western Hemisphere countries combined. South of the Rio Grande, roughly two-thirds of states maintain little more than internal security forces. The entire region's 33 countries field fewer than 700 combat aircraft compared to America's nearly 3,000.

Economic Gravity

Military dominance tells only part of the story. America serves as the hemisphere's economic linchpin. Nearly half of South American exports and 60-80% of Canadian and Mexican exports flow to the United States. This isn't reroutable commodity trade like what many countries conduct with China—it's tightly integrated supply chain trade, with finished goods and components built specifically for the US market.

The Western Hemisphere operates as a de facto dollar zone. Several countries use the dollar outright, many peg their currencies to it, and most regional trade occurs in dollars. When crises hit, rescue finance flows through US institutions. Remittances from America sustain large chunks of GDP across Central America and the Caribbean.

Unlike the Soviet Union, which imposed communism on Eastern Europe through coercion, America doesn't need to install an alien political project. Latin America has moved away from state-led socialism and revolutionary nationalism—discredited by Venezuela and Cuba's collapses—toward governments focused on managing crime and inflation, building fiscal stability, and attracting private investment.

The Pretenders

China and Russia, by contrast, can intimidate neighbors and sow disruption, but their influence quickly hits resistance and chokepoints. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin may dream of spheres, but they lack the fundamentals.

China offers transactions, not systems. Beijing builds infrastructure but pushes subsidized exports and opaque loans while extracting resources. Russia sells commodities and weapons. Neither provides a political or economic framework that regional states can meaningfully join, nor an ideology most would choose to emulate.

Consider the recent Venezuelan episode. When Washington moved against Maduro, neither Beijing nor Moscow could protect their supposed client. Both are ruled by brutal dictatorships with uncertain succession plans and erratic policies—Russia's Ukraine invasion and China's "zero COVID" lockdowns being obvious examples.

The Dangerous Asymmetry

This one-sphere world creates a dangerous dynamic. It leaves Chinese and Russian leaders too aggrieved to accept the status quo, while making America too secure to take Eurasian threats seriously until they explode. It also tempts Washington to trade global stewardship for coercive rule in its own backyard.

Yet this imbalance creates opportunity too. America can use its sphere not as a substitute for international order, but as its foundation. A one-sphere world gives Washington two rare advantages: unmatched power and a secure home base from which it could, if necessary, disengage from Eurasia.

That pairing—strength with a credible exit option—is already sharpening incentives among US allies to rearm. While pundits fixate on Davos speeches, states on the frontlines of Chinese and Russian coercion are rebuilding their militaries, industries, and supply chains. For the first time in decades, the outlines of a tougher, more resilient free world are emerging.

The Alliance Test

Whether these efforts endure depends on whether America can avoid China and Russia's greatest mistake: treating partners as vassals rather than contributors to shared strength. The liberal order gradually lost capable partners over decades of American dominance. Now, as allies face direct threats, they're rediscovering the need for self-reliance while maintaining cooperation.

This isn't the multipolar world many predicted. It's something stranger: one consolidated sphere facing contested space everywhere else. The question isn't whether America will maintain its dominance, but whether it can use that dominance wisely.