Supreme Court's Double Standard Test

What happens when America's highest court applies the same law differently based on which party benefits? We're about to find out.

Last month, the Supreme Court's Republican majority reinstated Texas's Republican gerrymander after a lower federal court struck it down. The plaintiffs presented considerable evidence that Texas's redistricting was motivated, at least partly, by racial considerations. But the Republican justices deemed this evidence insufficient—too "ambiguous" to prove illegal intent.

Now comes Tangipa v. Newsom, challenging California's Democratic gerrymander designed to offset Texas's Republican gains. The evidence of racial motivation in California is significantly weaker than what was presented in the Texas case. Yet California Republicans are asking the same Court that blessed Texas's maps to strike down California's.

The Mirror Image Problem

This isn't just about redistricting—it's a litmus test for judicial honesty. No competent lawyer, and certainly no reasonable judge, could logically conclude that Texas's gerrymander is lawful while California's constitutes illegal racial gerrymandering. The evidence simply doesn't support such contradictory findings.

If the Republican justices actually believe what they wrote in Abbott v. LULAC (the Texas case), they must deny this Republican challenge to California's maps. If they rule otherwise, it will confirm what many already suspect: this Court is willing to rig the game for partisan advantage.

Understanding the Stakes

To grasp why this matters, consider the two types of gerrymandering. "Partisan" gerrymandering favors one political party over another—and the Supreme Court ruled in 2019's Rucho v. Common Cause that federal courts must allow this. "Racial" gerrymandering targets specific ethnic groups, which remains theoretically challengeable in federal court, though the Republican majority has made such cases nearly impossible to win.

The key standard from LULAC: lawmakers enjoy an "extraordinarily high presumption of legislative good faith," and courts must interpret "ambiguous direct and circumstantial evidence" in favor of the legislature. In other words, if there's any way to view the evidence as innocent, courts must do so.

The Evidence Gap

In the Texas case, evidence of racial motivation came from a incompetently drafted Trump Justice Department letter that incorrectly claimed it's illegal to create districts where whites are a minority but two other racial groups combined form a majority. Texas officials, including Governor Greg Abbott, cited this letter to justify their new maps.

The Republican justices called this evidence "ambiguous" and insufficient.

In California, Republicans point to various statements by lawmakers and mapmakers. Most prove nothing—like faulting a state senator for saying California's maps uphold "the Voting Rights Act in all districts." Claiming compliance with federal law isn't a confession of illegal racial intent.

Their strongest evidence comes from Paul Mitchell, a private consultant hired by Democrats. After drawing the maps but before voter approval, Mitchell told a Latino interest group the new districts would "further increase Latino voting power" and create additional "Latino influence districts."

While politically tone-deaf, Mitchell's comments are easily interpreted as neutral descriptions of the maps' effects rather than admissions of racial intent. He may have been explaining that maps drawn for Democratic advantage would incidentally benefit Latino voters—not that he drew them specifically to increase Latino representation.

The Court's Own Words

Ironically, the Republican justices already suggested these cases are equivalent. Their LULAC opinion notes that "California responded with its own map for the stated purpose of counteracting what Texas had done." Justice Samuel Alito wrote separately that it's "indisputable" that both the Texas and California maps were motivated by "partisan advantage pure and simple."

To uphold California's map, the Republican justices need only apply their own LULAC reasoning consistently. The evidence of racial gerrymandering in California is, by their own standard, insufficiently clear to overcome the presumption of legislative good faith.

The 2026 Test

This case will reveal whether the Supreme Court's Republican majority views itself as a judicial body or a partisan institution. The legal reasoning that saved Texas's gerrymander should save California's—unless the goal isn't consistent jurisprudence but electoral manipulation.

Fairness to the Court's Republicans: they did acknowledge the partisan nature of both redistricting efforts in LULAC. They have a clear path to consistent ruling that would preserve both maps as examples of permissible partisan gerrymandering.

But if they strike down California while upholding Texas, they'll be admitting that their jurisprudence serves Republican electoral interests rather than constitutional principles.