Xi's Fourth Term Is a Given. China's Real Question: Who Comes Next?

The conversation in Beijing's corridors of power has shifted. It's no longer about whether Xi Jinping will step down—it's about who will eventually replace him. As China approaches the 21st Party Congress in 2027, the focus has moved from Xi's continuity to succession planning for the post-Xi era.

The Fourth Term: A Foregone Conclusion

Xi's fourth term appears inevitable, driven by one simple fact: there's no designated successor. The current Politburo Standing Committee and broader Politburo consist almost entirely of Xi's appointees. There are no visible political struggles or internal divisions within the Party's top leadership.

While discontent exists across society and at local levels, China's surveillance apparatus makes it unlikely that such dissatisfaction will evolve into organized opposition. Even recent upheavals in the military—including the downfall of Zhang Youxia, the top uniformed officer—haven't weakened Xi's grip on the People's Liberation Army.

What makes Xi's timeline particularly intriguing is his 2049 goal: building China into "a great modern socialist country in all respects" through the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." He's positioned 2035 as the midpoint toward that goal, leading some to believe he may maintain control until age 82—coincidentally, the same age at which Mao Zedong exited the political stage.

The 'Post-70s' Generation Takes Center Stage

Looking toward 2032 or 2035, what kind of candidates are being considered? If someone assumes leadership for a decade starting then, they should ideally still be in their sixties. Those born in 1972 will turn 60 in 2032, while those born in 1967 will be 65.

However, individuals born in the late 1960s were university students during the 1989 Tiananmen protests and are likely viewed critically by Xi's administration as having been influenced by Western ideas. This makes "younger" politicians from the 1970s more viable candidates.

Lists of so-called "Post-70s" deputy secretaries have been circulating in China, including:

• Zhuge Yujie (born 1971, Deputy Secretary of Hubei Provincial Party Committee)
• Shi Guanghui (born 1970, Deputy Secretary of Inner Mongolia)
• Yang Jinbai (born 1973, Deputy Secretary of Hainan Province)
• Liu Hongjian (born 1973, Deputy Secretary of Yunnan Province)
• Zhu Zhongming (born 1972, Deputy Secretary of Shanghai)

At the central government level, numerous vice minister-level officials born in the 1970s are also positioned for advancement, including Vice Foreign Minister Hua Chunying (born 1970) and Miao Deyu (born 1971).

Military and Diplomatic Succession Challenges

Succession planning faces particular challenges in military and diplomatic circles. Zhang Youxia's downfall has left the Central Military Commission with only Xi and newly promoted Zhang Shengmin. Born in 1958, Zhang Shengmin also serves as Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, placing him at the center of China's anti-corruption efforts.

Whether Zhang Youxia's fall represents further consolidation of Xi's military control or indicates rifts between theater commands and the Central Military Commission remains unclear. No unusual developments have been observed among theater commands, making it difficult to conclude that Xi's authority over the armed forces has weakened.

Diplomatic succession faces similar uncertainties. Wang Yi, born in 1953 (the same year as Xi), will be 74 in 2027, suggesting possible retirement. However, both Qin Gang and Liu Jianchao, seen as potential successors, have fallen from favor to varying degrees.

The Broader Implications

This succession uncertainty carries global implications. China's next leader will inherit the world's second-largest economy, ongoing tensions with Taiwan, complex relationships with the United States and Europe, and domestic challenges including demographic decline and economic restructuring.

The selection process in 2027 will likely focus less on whether Xi stays for a fourth term and more on identifying potential successors. Observers will watch closely to see if this process involves the kind of political upheavals seen in recent military and diplomatic appointments.

The "Post-70s" generation represents a cohort that came of age during China's economic reform period, potentially bringing different perspectives on governance, international relations, and domestic policy. However, their political formation under Xi's increasingly centralized system may also shape their approach to leadership.