US-Iran Nuclear Talks: Déjà Vu or Real Progress?

The same words. The same cautious optimism. The same "progress" being made.

"I think they want to make a deal," said President Donald Trump ahead of the latest Geneva talks on February 17, 2026. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi noted progress on "guiding principles." We've heard this script before—most recently in spring 2025, during five rounds of talks that ended with U.S. bombs falling on Iranian nuclear facilities.

As someone who spent two decades researching nonproliferation and worked in State Department nuclear diplomacy, I recognize this pattern. The question isn't whether both sides want to talk—it's whether they can overcome the fundamental contradictions that have hardened since May 8, 2018, when Trump first withdrew from the Obama-era nuclear deal.

The Immovable Objects

Iran's position remains crystal clear: nuclear talks only. No discussion of ballistic missiles—that's their red line. No talk of regional proxy support. No human rights conditions.

The U.S. position is equally firm: everything must be on the table. Ballistic missile limits, ending proxy support, complete uranium enrichment abandonment—including the low-level civilian enrichment permitted under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

This same deadlock prevented deal renewal during the Biden administration. The original JCPOA, signed by China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the U.S., and Iran, halted Iran's nuclear development in exchange for sanctions relief. Missiles and proxies were excluded then because Iran refused to include them. The calculation was simple: a nuclear deal was better than no deal at all.

A Changed Game

But the landscape has shifted dramatically. During the four years since JCPOA collapsed, Iran significantly advanced its nuclear capabilities. By 2022, Tehran had removed all International Atomic Energy Agency surveillance, started enriching uranium to near-weapons levels, and stockpiled enough material for several nuclear weapons.

The timeline is stark: under the 2015 deal, Iran needed over a year to produce enough fissile material for a bomb. Today, despite the 2025 U.S. strikes, that "breakout time" is down to weeks or months.

Even after Operation Rising Lion in June 2025—when the U.S. attacked Iran's nuclear infrastructure following reports of a 50% surge in near-weapons grade uranium—satellite imagery shows Iran working to restore its nuclear program. Most ballistic missile infrastructure has already been rebuilt.

Competing Calculations

Trump believes Iran is weaker now. Israeli attacks have degraded Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran's main proxy forces. The bloody crackdown on anti-government protests left thousands dead, revealing internal instability. The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group's January deployment near Iranian waters sent a clear message of U.S. support for protesters.

"If they don't make a deal," Trump warned, "the consequences are very steep."

But Washington may be overestimating its hand. While Gaza and Lebanon proxies are weakened, Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, including Kataib Hezbollah, have renewed war preparations—potentially against the U.S. Houthi rebels threaten to withdraw from their ceasefire deal with America.

Meanwhile, Iran's commitment to its missile program appears stronger than ever, with infrastructure rapidly rebuilding from last year's strikes.

The Shrinking Window

There was a window for deal renewal between the two Trump administrations. Biden publicly pledged to strengthen the Obama-era agreement in 2021. But by then, Iran's technical advances had made simple restoration insufficient—Tehran would need to surrender new capabilities for no additional benefits.

That window slammed shut in 2022 when Iran removed IAEA monitoring and began weapons-level enrichment. Today, the UN's nuclear watchdog maintains only basic safeguards Iran had agreed to before JCPOA.

Most analysts doubt Iran has developed full weaponization knowledge—estimates range from several months to two years due to limited access to Iran's weapons research. But Iran's technical advances have reduced the value of returning to the 2015 framework. Nuclear knowledge can't be put back in Pandora's box.

Beyond the Deal

Yet talks don't necessarily need an endpoint to have value. With military brinkmanship escalating—Iran recently closed the Strait of Hormuz for live-fire drills while U.S. forces build up in the Persian Gulf—dialogue could help both sides step back from the edge.

Both would benefit from stabilization: Iran economically, through reintegration into the international system; the U.S. through verifiable extension of Iran's nuclear breakout timeline.

None of this is guaranteed. I witnessed talks fail in 2009 regarding North Korea's nuclear program after six years of on-and-off progress. The consequence: a more unstable East Asia and renewed South Korean interest in developing nuclear weapons.

The same dynamic appears here. As time passes without a deal, both sides harden their starting positions, making agreement less likely. Military escalations may force Iranian compromise—or precipitate Tehran's decision to build nuclear weapons.