The End of Nuclear Arms Control: A New Era of Strategic Competition

The last major nuclear arms control treaty between the world's two largest nuclear powers expires in 2026, and neither Washington nor Moscow shows interest in renewal. With it ends a 50-year era of negotiated limits on humanity's most destructive weapons.

The collapse isn't sudden—it's been building for years. Since 2019, major treaties have fallen like dominoes: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and now New START. What took decades to build has unraveled in less than half a decade.

The Unraveling of Détente

The nuclear arms control regime began with Nixon and Brezhnev's 1972SALT I agreement, born from mutual recognition that unchecked nuclear competition served neither superpower. For decades, even during the tensest Cold War moments, both sides maintained that nuclear weapons were too dangerous to leave completely unregulated.

That consensus is dead. Putin's Russia has suspended participation in New START and threatened to resume nuclear testing. The Biden administration, while officially supporting arms control, has made clear it won't extend treaties unilaterally. "We cannot have arms control in a vacuum," a senior State Department official recently told Congress.

The immediate trigger was Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but the deeper cause is structural: the emergence of China as a nuclear peer competitor. Beijing's arsenal is projected to reach 1,000 warheads by 2030—nearly tripling from today's estimated 400.

The Three-Way Problem

Traditional arms control was designed for a bipolar world. Two superpowers could negotiate limits because they faced only each other. Today's reality is messier: three major powers with different nuclear doctrines, delivery systems, and strategic objectives.

China refuses trilateral negotiations until the US and Russia "drastically reduce" their arsenals first—a non-starter given current tensions. Beijing maintains its no-first-use policy while rapidly developing hypersonic missiles, mobile launchers, and submarine-based deterrents that complicate any verification regime.

This isn't just about numbers. Modern nuclear weapons are smaller, more accurate, and increasingly integrated with conventional forces. The line between nuclear and non-nuclear conflict has blurred, making traditional arms control categories obsolete.

Allies in the Crossfire

US allies face the starkest consequences. Countries like South Korea, Japan, and NATO members have relied on American extended deterrence—the promise that the US nuclear umbrella protects them. But as threats multiply and treaties disappear, that umbrella looks increasingly threadbare.

South Korean polls show 70% support for independent nuclear weapons. Similar sentiments are rising in Japan and even Germany. The Biden administration has worked overtime to reassure allies through new agreements and deployments, but the fundamental question remains: Can extended deterrence work in a multipolar nuclear world?

Meanwhile, regional powers are drawing their own conclusions. Iran continues enriching uranium, North Korea tests new delivery systems, and others watch carefully. If great powers abandon arms control, why should middle powers accept constraints?

The Technology Factor

Emerging technologies make the situation more complex. Artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and space weapons don't fit existing treaty frameworks. How do you verify compliance when weapons can be hidden in cyberspace or launched from orbit?

Private companies now build components for nuclear weapons. SpaceX launches military satellites, tech giants develop AI for defense applications, and startups work on autonomous systems. The neat distinction between military and civilian nuclear programs—a cornerstone of arms control—no longer holds.