The End of the Assassination Taboo: A New World Order?

On Saturday, the United States and Israel crossed a line that had held for half a century. Their joint assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, marks the first time since World War II that Washington has successfully killed a foreign leader—shattering a precedent sustained by decades of moral, political, and logistical concerns.

The question isn't whether Khamenei deserved his fate. For 40 years, he oversaw a repressive regime with terrorist tentacles reaching across the globe. The question is what happens when the world's most powerful military decides that targeted killing of foreign leaders is back on the table.

The 50-Year Prohibition

In February 1976, President Gerald Ford signed Executive Order 11905, directing that "no employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination." This wasn't abstract policy—it was personal.

As a member of the Warren Commission investigating John F. Kennedy's assassination, Ford had stood in the Texas School Book Depository, looking through a rifle scope similar to the one Lee Harvey Oswald used. "Kennedy had been my friend," Ford later recalled. "The thought we were reconstructing his assassination sent a chill down my spine."

When Ford learned that the CIA had enlisted the Mafia in failed attempts to kill Fidel Castro, he was appalled. "Although none of these assassinations had been carried out," he wrote in his memoirs, "the fact that government officials had even considered them was distressing."

Ford's successors actually strengthened the ban. Ronald Reagan dropped the qualifier "political," directing that "no person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." That prohibition remained in effect through every administration—until now.

Technology Changes Everything

What changed wasn't American morality, but American capability. The September 11 attacks shifted public opinion, making Americans broadly supportive of targeting individual terrorists. Congress gave President George W. Bush authorization to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against al-Qaeda. Most significantly, new technology made precision killing possible.

Armed Predator drones allowed commanders to surveil and target individuals from thousands of miles away. In 2011, President Barack Obama used this technology to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen living in Yemen. The public barely flinched at these "remote death sentences" or reports of innocents killed as "collateral damage."

By 2020, President Trump's authorization to kill Qassem Soleimani showed how far the boundaries had shifted. As head of Iran's Quds Force, Soleimani was part of a state-directed terrorist network that had killed American soldiers. But the U.S. wasn't actually at war with Iran, making Soleimani something of a political target.

The Perfect Storm

After October 7, 2023, Israel's assassination campaign against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders revealed intelligence capabilities that would have been unimaginable during the Cold War. The U.S. apparently blinded Tehran during nuclear facility raids and Venezuela during the capture of President Nicolás Maduro—indicating that concerns about losing pilots to anti-aircraft systems have largely evaporated.

Compare this to 1960, when an Eisenhower administration official asked whether "any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul [Castro], and Che Guevara." The CIA's response? Such action was "uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution" and "beyond our capabilities."

Today, the intelligence community and military likely have the tools to target any political leader on Earth. This represents an enormously consequential shift in available foreign policy tools.

The Moral and Strategic Calculus

Killing anyone without trial involves a moral choice. Killing a foreign leader involves strategic calculations with uncertain outcomes. Despite popular metaphors, regimes aren't chickens—decapitating them doesn't guarantee their death. No modern police state has died by assassination alone.

There's also the retaliation factor. As killing foreign leaders becomes easier for us, harming our leaders presumably becomes easier for others. The international taboo against political assassination has arguably had a stabilizing effect, despite violations by states like Russia.

The 1960 CIA assessment noted that eliminating Castro, his brother, and Che Guevara simultaneously was "beyond our capabilities." If tasked with a similar assignment today, the answer would likely be different. The technology exists; the question is whether we should use it.