China's Military Purges Aren't About Taiwan. Here's What They're Really About

Last month, Beijing placed Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and member Liu Zhenli under investigation for alleged disciplinary violations. Predictably, the news triggered a familiar refrain: What does this mean for Taiwan?

The answer might surprise you. Probably not much.

Three Flawed Narratives

Commentary linking these military purges to Taiwan falls into three camps. Some argue war is more likely because fewer senior officers can restrain Xi Jinping. Others contend the corruption exposed makes Beijing less prepared for conflict, reducing aggression risks. Still others see Xi clearing obstacles to accelerate Taiwan operation readiness.

All three explanations overstate Taiwan's relevance to what's actually happening inside China's military leadership.

State media reports about the actions against Zhang and Liu emphasize rooting out corruption, enforcing ideological discipline, and safeguarding the Communist Party's "absolute control" over the military. References to building stronger forces appear mostly in abstract terms, largely in the context of preserving Xi's authority.

This shouldn't surprise anyone. The People's Liberation Army's core mission has always been regime security. Everything else—including Taiwan unification—comes second.

Political Necessity Trumps Military Readiness

The popular narratives connecting PLA purges to Taiwan rest on a shaky assumption: that Beijing's decision to use force will hinge on military operational readiness.

Historical evidence doesn't support this. Studies of previous Chinese military actions show Beijing's force decisions are driven by perceptions of political necessity, not military preparedness.

Sure, any country would struggle launching complex joint operations with disrupted command structures. But Beijing's Taiwan interest is fundamentally political. Any force decision would be made by Xi, who's driven primarily by domestic political interests.

How much influence his generals have over decision-making is speculation. But judging from Xi's governance style elsewhere, he likely dictates more than he listens.

Xi's Survival Calculus

While we can't know Xi's thinking, both China's political system and his 14-year track record indicate his overriding priority is political survival. Taiwan's sensitivity in Chinese political discourse makes it inseparable from this concern.

No Chinese leader can afford to appear to forfeit Beijing's Taiwan claim. If Xi concludes military force is necessary to preserve that claim, he'll likely act regardless of PLA readiness or generals' advice. Even high failure risk won't deter him if he believes his legitimacy is threatened.

Fortunately, Xi has strong incentives not to use force unless military action poses less risk to his political standing than inaction. Such judgment would most likely respond to formal Taiwan independence declaration—nearly impossible under the island's political and constitutional system.

The Real Risk of Premature Action

The surest way for Xi to jeopardize China's Taiwan claim would be forcing unification before he's confident the PLA would prevail against not only Taiwan but also the United States, Japan, and other regional powers he must assume would intervene.

Even successful campaigns would likely be long and costly, inflicting economic and social damage setting China back decades and derailing Xi's national rejuvenation vision. Nothing in Xi's tenure suggests he's inclined toward such reckless risk-taking.

These dynamics long predate Xi's military anti-corruption drive and will persist after the CMC is reconstituted.

What Analysts Are Missing

The removal of senior officers certainly handicaps the PLA. But the idea this will meaningfully shape Beijing's Taiwan decision-making misunderstands how these decisions are made.

Xi's political interests—not PLA readiness—will largely determine whether China uses force. The current purges reflect genuine disciplinary concerns and political maneuvering independent of Taiwan strategy.

For intelligence analysts and policymakers, this distinction matters enormously. Focusing on military readiness metrics might miss the real indicators of Chinese intentions: Xi's domestic political pressures and calculations.