How US Allies Really View Taiwan (Hint: It's Not China's Way)

Just 70 miles separate Japanese territory from Taiwan. That short distance explains why Tokyo sometimes moves faster than Washington when it comes to Taiwan policy – and why the island's fate matters far beyond the Taiwan Strait.

A new book by Indiana University's Adam Liff, "U.S. Allies and the Taiwan Strait," reveals something surprising: America's closest allies aren't just following Washington's lead on Taiwan. They're charting their own courses, often ahead of the US itself.

The most striking finding? None of America's major democratic allies actually endorsed Beijing's "One China principle" when they recognized the People's Republic of China. That seemingly technical distinction has created enormous space for creative diplomacy.

Japan: The Trailblazer

Japan offers the clearest example of allied agency. As arguably America's most important treaty ally, Japan has sometimes "blazed a trail" that Washington would later follow. Geography matters here – when you're 70 miles from Taiwan, cross-strait tensions aren't abstract geopolitical concepts.

Tokyo maintains an intentionally ambiguous "non-position" on Taiwan's legal status while insisting on "peaceful resolution." This roughly aligns with US policy, but Japan often acts first. The pattern repeats across other allies: they're not passive followers but active shapers of Taiwan policy.

South Korea presents an interesting contrast. Seoul's longtime focus on North Korea left the Taiwan Strait as "something of an afterthought" in foreign policy discourse. Yet even South Korea carefully avoids endorsing Beijing's sovereignty claim while quietly maintaining important ties with Taipei.

The 'One China' Misunderstanding

Here's where things get interesting. Despite widespread misinformation suggesting otherwise, neither the United States nor its major democratic allies endorsed Beijing's "One China principle" upon recognition. That principle explicitly claims Taiwan as part of the PRC – something Western allies never accepted.

Most major democratic US allies recognized Beijing years before Washington did (South Korea in 1992 was the exception). They weren't following America's lead; they were making independent decisions.

A German Foreign Office official put it bluntly at a 2022 conference: "We steadfastly reject [Beijing's 'One China principle'] and the notion behind that. We have our One China policy... But, it is us who have devised this policy and it is us who interpret this policy – no one else."

'Practically Flexible Ambiguity' in Action

This ambiguous positioning creates what Liff calls "practically flexible ambiguity." Political leaders can interpret their government's vague official position however they see fit – within limits, of course.

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The real-world consequences are significant. Over the past half-decade, allies have pursued deeper "unofficial" ties: more frequent legislative exchanges, Cabinet minister visits, agreement signings, and other efforts – some not officially acknowledged.

All but one national government examined in Liff's book has recently conducted naval transits through the Taiwan Strait. All have expressed concern about cross-strait peace and stability. Most support Taiwan's participation in international organizations where statehood isn't required.

Europe Enters the Game

Even before China and Russia announced their "no limits partnership" on the eve of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, European views of China were shifting. The EU's 2019 designation of China as "partner," "competitor," and "rival" reflected this evolution.

The EU's 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy explicitly linked cross-strait stability to European security and prosperity. This makes sense: the EU has extraordinary trade and investment relationships throughout East Asia. European leaders also recognize their indirect stakes through extensive ties with the United States, Japan, and other regional partners.

NATO has moved similarly. Its 2022 Strategic Concept identified PRC "ambitions and coercive policies" as challenges to member states' "interests, security and values." The organization has designated Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan as "Indo-Pacific partners."

Perhaps most striking were 2023 statements by NATO's then secretary-general, who spoke openly about the importance of the cross-strait status quo. While NATO isn't considering a direct role in potential Taiwan contingencies, the rhetorical shift is unmistakable.

The Stakes Keep Rising

Beijing's increasingly brazen coercion and large-scale military exercises have clarified the stakes for everyone. This isn't just about Taiwan's 23 million people or regional stability – it's about the globalized economy on which even geographically distant European allies depend.

The semiconductor industry provides the clearest example. Taiwan produces over 60% of the world's semiconductors and 90% of the most advanced chips. Any disruption would cascade through global supply chains, affecting everything from smartphones to automobiles.