Can Private Military Contractors Stabilize Gaza?

7,000 Hamas fighters emerged on Gaza's streets on the first day of the ceasefire. Despite two years of devastating war with Israel, Hamas still controls half of the Gaza Strip and shows no intention of giving up its weapons.

When President Trump triumphantly announced the Gaza ceasefire agreement in Egypt last October, declaring "nobody thought this could happen," he was right about one thing: getting to the ceasefire was indeed difficult. But the hardest part may still lie ahead. Sustainable peace requires disarming and dethroning Hamas—and the militant group is actively reasserting its authority by eliminating competitors and repeatedly firing on Israeli forces.

When Traditional Peacekeeping Fails

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) don't want another ground offensive. They need time to rest, refit, and re-equip, and Israel would face severe diplomatic consequences from renewed military action. The Palestinian Authority's security forces lack both the strength and willingness to fight Hamas—they couldn't even control much weaker terrorist groups in the West Bank.

What about UN forces? Despite the UN Security Council endorsing Trump's peace plan, the track record isn't promising. UN peacekeepers failed to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament in Lebanon, and Israel's trust in the UN has plummeted after some aid workers were implicated in the October 7 attacks. Even if these obstacles disappeared, UN peacekeepers are just that—peacekeepers, not equipped for intensive military action against a well-armed militant group.

Trump's proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF) faces its own challenges. Egypt will only help maintain an already established peace. Jordan's King Abdullah was blunt: "We hope that [the ISF mandate] is peacekeeping, because if it's peace enforcing, nobody will want to touch that." Indonesia offered up to 20,000 troops, but strictly for non-combat roles. The UAE, one of Israel's closest regional allies, won't provide any soldiers.

The fundamental problem? No country wants their troops fighting Hamas directly.

The Private Military Option

Enter an unconventional solution proposed by former U.S. officials Elliott Abrams, Eric Edelman, and Rena Gabber in Foreign Affairs: private military contractors. These aren't mercenaries of old, but "well-trained, highly capable military personnel with experience serving in elite units" who "will not shy away from potential conflict with Hamas terrorists."

The logic is compelling. Private contractors have a proven track record from America's war on terror. They can deploy faster than any international force, potentially pushing back Hamas before the group gains more power. Unlike national militaries bound by political constraints, contractors operate under clearer rules of engagement and face fewer diplomatic complications.

But this solution raises profound questions. Who oversees these contractors? What happens if operations go wrong? How will Gazans react to foreign mercenaries operating in their territory?

A Web of Competing Interests

The stakeholder reactions would be complex and contradictory. Israel might welcome any force capable of neutralizing Hamas, but would worry about accountability if contractors fail or cause civilian casualties. Palestinians would likely view foreign contractors as occupiers, potentially fueling more resistance.

Arab nations present a puzzle. Some might pragmatically support "outsourcing" the Hamas problem to non-Arab forces, avoiding the political costs of direct involvement. Others could frame contractor deployment as neo-colonial intervention, rallying opposition across the region.

Internationally, European allies would demand strict human rights oversight and legal frameworks. China and Russia would likely condemn it as another Western intervention in the Middle East. The precedent could reshape how future conflicts are managed—or mismanaged.

The Precedent Problem

Beyond Gaza, this proposal could fundamentally alter international conflict resolution. If private contractors successfully stabilize Gaza, other nations might increasingly outsource their security challenges to corporate solutions. The line between state responsibility and corporate action would blur further.

Consider the implications: Would this normalize private military intervention in sovereign territories? Could wealthy nations simply hire contractors instead of risking their own soldiers? What happens to international law when corporations, not countries, become primary security actors?

The economic incentives are clear—contractors profit from prolonged engagement, potentially creating perverse incentives to maintain rather than resolve conflicts.