Gaza Peace Talks: Learning from America's Middle East Successes and Failures

Fifteen months. That's how long President Trump's Gaza ceasefire has held. But with sporadic fighting continuing between Israeli forces and Hamas militants, the truce sits on increasingly thin ice.

The October 2025 agreement envisions Hamas's formal dissolution, a US-led Board of Peace, and an International Stabilization Force. The UN Security Council blessed the plan's framework. Yet the reality is stark: trust between Hamas and Israel remains virtually nonexistent, while Arab nations watch developments with deep concern.

The collapse of previous peace efforts—most notably the breakdown of the Oslo accords in the late 1990s—invites fresh cynicism. But dismissing this latest attempt as doomed would be premature. America's half-century of Middle East mediation offers a roadmap of what works and what doesn't.

The Anatomy of Success

The 1979 Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel endure to this day. So does the 1994 Jordan-Israel agreement. What made these breakthroughs possible while other efforts foundered?

Carnegie Endowment researchers identify several critical factors. High-level, sustained engagement proved essential. Jimmy Carter didn't just host a summit—he sequestered Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David, shielding them from domestic political pressures.

Carter's decision to separate Egyptian-Israeli bilateral issues from the Palestinian question was crucial. This modular approach allowed negotiators to focus on concrete, finite problems—Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, normalization of ties—while deferring more complex Palestinian issues. Rather than letting one intractable issue sink the entire process, they built momentum through achievable wins.

The United States also backed words with resources. Egypt received substantial economic and military aid to replace Soviet support, helping Sadat weather domestic criticism. Israel got security cooperation and advanced military supplies, reducing the perceived costs of withdrawal. The treaty complemented territorial concessions with layered security guarantees: demilitarization, multinational observers, clear verification protocols.

Oslo's Bitter Lessons

The 1993 Oslo accords initially seemed promising. Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization formally recognized each other for the first time. But the process ultimately collapsed, offering painful lessons about what not to do.

Oslo's architects deliberately kept the agreement vague, avoiding mention of Palestinian statehood or ending Israeli occupation. This phased approach, while well-intentioned, created numerous opportunities for spoilers to disrupt progress.

More catastrophically, negotiators failed to prepare Israeli and Palestinian publics for peace. The result: Yitzhak Rabin's assassination by an Israeli extremist in 1995 and the eruption of the second intifada in 2000. Peace's enemies—the spoilers—weren't adequately managed or neutralized.

American mistakes compounded the problems. Focusing on confidence-building measures rather than comprehensive agreement actually incentivized minimal compromise. Tabling "final status issues"—the conflict's core—led to hollow agreements that never addressed what mattered most. Even $3.6 billion in donor pledges couldn't overcome these fundamental flaws.

The Current Challenge

Today's Gaza situation presents familiar patterns but new complexities. Like Oslo, Trump's plan faces the challenge of transforming a fragile ceasefire into sustainable peace. Unlike Camp David's bilateral focus, Gaza involves multiple stakeholders with competing interests.

Hamas remains committed to armed resistance despite military setbacks. Israel's security concerns run deep after the October 2023 attacks. Palestinian civilians, caught in the middle, have endured devastating losses. Regional powers—from Egypt to Saudi Arabia—worry about instability spreading.

The Trump administration's approach shows both promise and peril. High-level engagement is evident, but sustaining it will be crucial. The modular approach—focusing first on Hamas's dissolution and Gaza's reconstruction—echoes Camp David's successful strategy. Yet without addressing broader Palestinian aspirations for statehood, this could repeat Oslo's mistakes.

Beyond the Immediate Crisis

What makes this moment different is the regional context. The Abraham Accords normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, creating new diplomatic possibilities. Saudi Arabia's potential recognition of Israel—long contingent on Palestinian progress—offers powerful incentives.

Yet spoilers remain active on all sides. Israeli settlers oppose territorial concessions. Palestinian militants reject anything short of full liberation. Regional powers pursue their own agendas. Managing these diverse opponents of peace will require the kind of comprehensive strategy that Oslo lacked.

The international community's role has also evolved. Unlike the 1990s, when America dominated Middle East diplomacy, today's landscape includes more players—from China to Turkey—with their own interests and influence.