Nuclear Treaty Collapse Signals Dawn of Three-Way Arms Race

For the first time in decades, the world will wake up Thursday without a treaty limiting nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia—the two nations that control 90% of the planet's nuclear arsenal.

The collapse of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) marks more than just another failed diplomatic agreement. It signals the end of a 50-year era of bilateral nuclear arms control and potentially the beginning of something far more dangerous: a three-way nuclear arms race involving China.

Beijing on Tuesday made one final appeal for last-minute negotiations, urging Washington to "respond positively" to Russia's offers to maintain warhead limits. But China simultaneously rejected President Trump's repeated calls for trilateral disarmament talks, citing the vast disparity in nuclear stockpiles as grounds for staying out.

The End of an Era

Since 1972's SALT I agreement, Washington and Moscow have maintained some form of nuclear limitation treaty—even during the darkest days of the Cold War. New START, signed in 2010, capped each nation's deployed strategic warheads at 1,550 and delivery vehicles at 800.

That framework dies Thursday. Without legal constraints, both superpowers can now build as many nuclear weapons as they choose. Russia has already suspended treaty compliance, while the US froze nuclear cooperation after the Ukraine invasion.

The timing couldn't be worse. China's nuclear arsenal, once estimated at around 300 warheads, is now believed to exceed 500 and growing rapidly toward 1,000. What was once a bilateral balance is becoming a triangular competition.

China's Calculated Refusal

Beijing's rejection of three-way talks isn't diplomatic obstinacy—it's strategic calculation. With roughly one-tenth the nuclear weapons of its rivals, China sees joining arms control negotiations as premature self-limitation.

"The nuclear forces of China and the US are not on the same level at all," foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian stated Tuesday. The subtext is clear: China intends to build up to US-Russia levels before considering limits.

This creates a dangerous paradox. China's refusal to negotiate while expanding its arsenal gives Washington and Moscow justification to increase their own stockpiles. Each side's rational self-interest could trigger an irrational collective outcome.

The Domino Effect

The treaty's collapse reverberates far beyond the three major powers. Allies protected by US nuclear guarantees—from South Korea to Poland—may question Washington's commitment as nuclear threats multiply.

Already, 70% of South Koreans support developing independent nuclear weapons. Similar debates are emerging in other allied nations. The breakdown of great power arms control could accelerate nuclear proliferation among middle powers.

Non-aligned nations face an equally troubling prospect: being caught between competing nuclear blocs with no legal restraints on their arsenals. The Cold War's bipolar nuclear standoff at least had rules. A tripolar competition has none.

Beyond Mutual Assured Destruction

The original logic of nuclear arms control—that both sides benefit from limiting an expensive and dangerous competition—breaks down with three players. Game theory suggests that triangular competitions are inherently less stable than bilateral ones.

Moreover, the three nuclear powers have fundamentally different strategic cultures. US doctrine emphasizes extended deterrence for allies. Russia increasingly relies on nuclear threats to compensate for conventional weakness. China traditionally maintained a minimal deterrent but is now embracing "effective deterrence."

These divergent approaches make negotiating common limits extraordinarily difficult, even if all parties were willing.