Britain Won't Pick Sides: Starmer's China Visit Signals New Foreign Policy Era

"I'm often invited to simply choose between countries. I don't do that." With these words, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer drew a line in the sand before his China visit this week. It's a statement that would have been unthinkable from a British leader just a few years ago—and it signals the end of an era in British foreign policy.

For decades, the UK has treated alignment with Washington as gospel. When America embraced China, Britain talked up a "golden era" of relations. When the US pivoted to rivalry, London dutifully banned Huawei from 5G networks and toughened investment screenings. The formula was simple: follow America's lead, ask questions later.

But Starmer's Beijing trip represents something different—a declaration that Britain will no longer be a passenger in a contest defined by others.

The Limits of Automatic Alignment

The shift didn't happen overnight. Britain's China policy over the past decade reads like a case study in strategic whiplash. Under David Cameron, the UK courted Chinese investment with unprecedented enthusiasm. Xi Jinping received a state visit complete with golden carriages and palace banquets. British officials spoke of becoming China's "best partner in the West."

Then came the pivot. As Donald Trump launched his trade war and Washington's China consensus hardened, Britain's tune changed. Huawei was ejected from critical infrastructure. Investment screening tightened. The "golden era" became a historical footnote.

This reactive approach came with costs. British businesses watched as competitors from Germany and France maintained stronger trade ties with China while the UK's economic relationship withered. Trade between Britain and China, once growing rapidly, stagnated. Meanwhile, the promised benefits of closer US alignment—a comprehensive trade deal, for instance—failed to materialize.

Starmer's visit to China represents an acknowledgment that this model has reached its limits. In a multipolar world, automatic alignment with any single power—even a close ally—constrains more than it enables.

Strategic Balancing in Practice

What does this new approach look like in practice? Starmer's framework is deceptively simple: maintain security cooperation with the US while creating space for economic and diplomatic engagement with China. It's compartmentalization—separating areas where Britain follows Washington's lead from those where it demands room for maneuver.

"We've got very close relations with the US—of course, we want to—and we will maintain that business, alongside security and defense," Starmer explained. "Equally, just sticking your head in the sand and ignoring China when it's the second-biggest economy in the world and there are business opportunities wouldn't be sensible."

This isn't abandoning the special relationship—it's redefining it. Britain remains firmly in the Western security camp, committed to NATO and intelligence sharing with the Five Eyes alliance. But on trade, climate change, and global governance, London is signaling it will chart its own course.

The timing matters. Starmer's visit comes just weeks after Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney faced US tariff threats for his Beijing trip. By proceeding anyway, Britain is testing whether middle powers can pursue independent China policies without facing Washington's wrath.

The Risks of Going It Alone

This balancing act isn't without dangers. In Washington, there's growing impatience with allies who try to have it both ways—security cooperation with America, economic benefits from China. The US has already shown willingness to pressure partners through tariffs and sanctions. Britain could find itself caught in the crossfire.

From Beijing's perspective, Britain's approach may seem opportunistic. After years of following Washington's lead in restricting Chinese investment and technology, can London credibly claim to be an independent actor? Chinese officials are likely to demand concrete proof of Britain's new stance—perhaps through policy reversals or significant new agreements.

There are domestic political risks too. Starmer's Conservative opponents are already framing the China visit as weakness, abandoning Britain's values for economic gain. The Labour leader will need to show that engagement doesn't mean acquiescence to Beijing's authoritarian practices or territorial ambitions.

The View from Elsewhere

Britain's shift reflects a broader trend among middle powers seeking strategic autonomy. Germany has long maintained robust economic ties with China despite US pressure. France pursues its own version of strategic balancing. Even traditional US allies like Australia are recalibrating their approaches after experiencing the economic costs of confrontation.

But Britain's position is unique. As a permanent UN Security Council member, nuclear power, and financial hub, the UK carries more weight than most middle powers. Its choices could influence how other allies approach the US-China rivalry.

From Beijing's perspective, Britain represents a potential crack in the Western consensus. If London can successfully compartmentalize its relationship—security with the US, economics with China—it could provide a template for other European allies.